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Abstract
Through exploration and analysis of economic, historical and political factors stemming
from

the authoritarian period (1973-1990) to the present day , this project offers an

interdisciplinary explanation of the emergence of the " Penguin' s Revolution" in Chile. In May
June 2006, 700,000 high school students paralyzed the Chilean education system by protesting in
the streets, taking over schools and not attending classes. Students organized under the
Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students (ACES) demanded that the government take
responsibility for providing universal high quality and equal education. The roots of student
discontent lie in the multi-dimensional education crisis, generated by the semi-privatized,
decentralized educational system created by Augusto Pinochet in 1980 and the failure of
subsequent democratic administrations to alter the model. A breakdown of the government's
response to the student movement will also be presented along with implications for the future.

IX

Introduction
In May 2006, mass protests by high school students erupted in Santiago, Chile , spreading
to almost every other major city in Chile. More than 700,000 students participated in the protests,
popularly known as La Revolu cion Pinguina (The Penguins' Revolution) due to the black and
white uniforms worn by public school students in Santiago. Spurred by increases in the cost
university admissions tests and student transportation, the movement eventually called for the
repeal of the Organic Constitutional Law of Teaching (LOCE) that dictator Augusto Pinochet
implemented on March 10th, 1990, the day before leaving power. LOCE allowed for the
"freedom of choice" in education, essentially opening the market for education and allowing
schools to compete for students. This and other binding laws implemented by the military
dictatorship made it almost impossible for the ruling center-left political coalition to win a
majority in the Legislature, in turn increasing the difficulty to implement structural reforms to
the decentralized, neoliberal educational model established in the 1980s.
These protests projected a general discontent about the fundamental organization and
performance of the educational system in Chile. However, other factors also contributed to the
eruption of the movement. I argue that at its roots, these collective complaints are a result of the
harsh socio-economic inequality that exists in Chilean society and the fact that the current
education system reproduces this inequality. It also reflects wide-ranging dissatisfaction with the
Chilean political system among the first generation of youth not to grow up under dictatorship.
Students' grievances are further aggravated by the belief that the political party system is unable
or unwilling to meet citizens' demands due to both authoritarian enclaves and the changing
nature of the Chilean political system . Sixteen years after the arrival of democracy, the Penguins'
Revolution still exemplifies remnants of Chile's democratic transition. In they eyes of student

x
protesters, the outcome of the negotiations between with government represent another
"compromise" that will not bring about real change.
This topic is noteworthy because it can be approached from an interdisciplinary manner,
exploring historical, economic and political factors that contributed to the outbreak and results of
the movement. A wealth of scholarly literature exists that relates to topics explored in this thesis,
such as neoliberalism, the privatization of education, Chilean educational reform, transitions to
democracy and popular protest. However, there are very few scholarly works published that
solel y examines the Revoluci6n Pinguina on its own. For tills reason, this thesis will make a
significant contribution to the understanding of the event in an historical , economic and political
context.
The thesis is organized in four chapters. Chapter One describes the neoliberal antecedents
to the current educational system, put into place by the Pinochet Dictatorship starting in 1980, as
well as attempts to "pay back the social debt " through reforms during the 1990s. Chapter Two
explains the current educational crisis and the development of the three months of protests that
would come to be called The Penguins' Revolution . Chapter Three analyzes the role that the
educ ational system plays in perpetuating Chile's vast socio-economic inequality, and how it
caused the students to protest. The final chapter explores popular protest as a way to bring about
political change, starting with the period under the dictatorship as well as analyzing the effect
that other student protests had on the Revoluci6n. In addition, it dissects political attitudes among
Chileans, especially students, stemming from the transition period, and how a political space was
opened for popular protest in the twenty-first century. The chapter concludes by describing the
political outcomes of the protests.

Xl

The scope of this investigation remains limited to the capital city of Santiago, because the
protests started and were largest here. Santiago provides an interesting case study because it
itself is divided along socio-economic lines; neighborhoods are clearly delineated according to
household income and wealth. I use a mixed method of quantitative and qualitative analysis, as
well as comparison and review of scholarly literature on topics related to the protest as
mentioned above. Quantitatively, I evaluate data on school and student performance available
through the Chilean Ministry of Education, demonstrating the inequality of educational quality
according to socioeconomic groups and school type . I use the results from various opinion polls
to evaluate students' and citizens' attitudes towards politics and the education system.
In January 2008 I traveled to Santiago, Chile where using anthropological methods I
interviewed student leaders of the movement, members of the Teachers' Union and a participant
of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Education. For the most part , their experiences,
opinions and attitudes reinforced the conclusions presented in the above-mentioned data, but I
also gained invaluable insights into the inner workings of the protest themselves. Most
importantly, I gained an understanding of attitudes towards outcome of the protests, and the
possible future of the student movement in Chile. I found out that there is a huge gap between
policy-makers and the students themselves when it comes to educational policy. Educational
policy-makers see the outcome of the protests as a triumph for participatory democracy, whereas
students are disappointed, and see a compromise and mollification of discontent in the face of the
limitations posed on the political system by the authoritarian legacy and neoliberal economic
theory.

1

Chapter One
Neoliberal Antecedents
The current education system in Chile is based on a model conceived by the infamous
Chicago Boys, economists trained at the University of Chicago in neoliberal theory. Chilean
education is presently decentralized, semi-privatized and funded by a voucher system. As
characterized in Table 1.1, three types of schools exist: municipal schools administered by
municipalities and publicly funded by per-student vouchers, subsidized private schools that are
run by a private entity (business, church, etc.) and publicly funded by vouchers, and
unsubsidized private schools that are managed and funded privately. This chapter will explore
the history of this system, and the effects that it had on education throughout the 1980s. It will
also examine changes to the system enacted by administrations following the transition to
democracy in 1990 to improve and modernize a system that had been neglected for an entire
decade.

1.1 Educational Reforms of the 1980s
As Joseph P. Farrell notes, the education system in Chile has historically been considered
one of the best and most advanced

In

Latin America, and Chilean policy makers have

consistently employed policies to try to improve the system. Under the administration of
Eduardo Frei Montalva (1965-1970) , I educational reforms backed by necessary financial
resources sought to expand the system and provide access to a greater sector of the population.
Curriculum changes were also made, including increasing primary schooling from six to eight
years and decreasing secondary school from six to four years, an arrangement that is still in
effect today? This is not to say that the education system prior to the Pinochet regime did not

Not to be confused with his son, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Chilean President 1994-2000.
Joseph F. Farrell , The National Unified School in Allende's Chile, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1986),30,34 .
I
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have problems; it was inherently unequal and drop-out and repetition rates were high . However,
the administrations of Frei and his successor, Salvador Allende assigned importance to
improving the system through reform.
The socialist administration of Allende had a very different view of education. He saw
education as a way to create a "new man" for a socialist society. He sought to transform the
educational system through the creation of a National Unified School. This meant a system of
schools that would be democratic and integrated into the community, offering educational
opportunities regardless of socioeconomic level or philosophical beliefs. Teachers, parents and
administrators would work together in the decision making process. It would be nationalistic,
recognizing traditional Chilean values as well as class-consciousness and the struggle for the
proletariat. The term " unified" referred to the fact that this system would get rid of the divisions
between types of schools and grade levels. This model was seen as a way to liberate humans
from the exploitative capitalist methods of teaching.'
This was obviously a radical approach to education; Farrell attributes this specific
proposal to the fall of Allende 's administration in the 1973 military coup due to divisions it
caused within the ruling coalition and the fact that it alienated more moderate sectors of society
that had originally supported Allende. Nonetheless, this policy was never implemented; Allende
abandoned the proposition a few months before he fell from power. However, it is interesting to
note the stark contrast between the importance given to education by Allende and the utter
neglect of the system under the authoritarian dictatorship .
The implementation of the Organic Constitutional Law on Education (Ley Organica

Constitucional de Educacion, LOCE) on March 10, 1990 represented the culmination of over a
decade of economic reforms carried out by the authoritarian regime. As well as being infamous
3

Ibid, 97.
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for harsh political repression and human rights abuses, the military dictatorship in Chile is
known for an economic program that radically liberalized the Chilean economy with the help of
economists educated at the University of Chicago, known as the "Chicago Boys ." In his book on
the subject, Juan Gabriel Valdes argues that after the 1973 coup, the authoritarian regime lacked
a "government project;" the military as an institution had little experience in governing due to
Chile's strong history of democracy . The economy was in shambles with over 800% inflation
due to price controls set by the Allende government, as well as economic punishment from the
US in the form of cutting off bilateral aid and loans from international institutions." It was
obvious that the economy needed attention, but the regime lacked the technical expertise to
design an effective policy . Aided by a Cold War era scholastic partnership between the
Uni versity of Chicago and the Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica de Chile (PUC), Chilean
economists trained at Chicago became Pinochet' s economic team and began a neoliberal
reconstruction of the economy and the formation of a neoliberal state-the first of its kind in the

world.'
In the social sciences, the term neoliberalism is often misunderstood and poorly defined.
For the purposes of this paper, I will use David Harvey 's definition:
Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade/'
In this model, the role of the state is to create institutions to secure private property rights (such
as military, defense and legal systems) and to create markets in areas such as land, water,

Mary Spooner, Soldiers in a Narrow Land: the Pinochet Regime in Chile (Berkeley: University of California Pres s,
1994) :26.
5 Ju an Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet 's economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995): 16-18.
6 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 2 .

4
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education, health care, social security and environmental pollution. Other than that, the state
should not intervene because misinformation from interest groups could second-guess pnce
signals and cause inefficiency.

7

In Chile, the overall goal was to reduce and reorient the state 's role in the economy and
combat inflation. 8 The Chicago Boys ' first job was to negotiate loans through the International
Monetary Fund (lMF), and then to restructure the economy through privatization, deregulation of
natural resources, and the facilitation of foreign direct investment and freer trade. " The state's
role as producer, which was popular in Latin America in the 1960s-70s under the Import
Substitution Industrialization (lSI) program, was rejected under neoliberalism in exchange for
the "comparative advantages" of export goods such as mining, agriculture, forestry and fishing.
Under Allende, the state owned over 500 firms and banks; after privati zation, this was reduced to
twenty-five, including onl y one bank and the lucrative copper sector. State spending decreased
from 40% of GOP in 1973 to 26% of GOP in 1979 due to the decrease in state employment and
the elimination of many social programs.

10

Neoliberal reconstruction had enormous social costs due to the dismantling of social
welfare institutions, a drop in the real wage, increases in unemployment and severely limited
union power. The theory posits that unemployment is voluntary but created because labor has a
price below which it will not work." Under the military regime, unemployment rose from 9% to
18% in 1975. 12 With the Chicago Boys' policies, union bargaining power was extremely
diminished and could not prevent a fall in the real wage; by 1975 it had dropped to 64% of that

Ibid.
Valdes, 23 .
9 Harvey, 8.
ID Valdes, 22-23 .
I I Ibid, 53.
12 Spooner, 106.
7

8

5

of 1970.

13

In addition, neoliberal theory states that poverty should be eliminated through the

"trickle down effect" of free markets and free trade, with the state playing a minimal role in
poverty reduction." Marcus Taylor argues that neoliberals in Chile wanted to rid the state of
welfare institutions for two main reasons. First of all, interventions by the state were believed to
create inefficient economic outcomes. Secondly, social programs were seen as the "source and
outcome of the pervasive politicization of Chilean society.':" The elimination of the role of the
state in providing a "social safety net" of health care, social services and education left large
sectors of the population vulnerable to impoverishment, but the regime justified this as a way not
only to help the economy recover, but also to "depoliticize" the welfare system. As a result,
communities mobilized to organize soup kitchens and other self-help services. The regime saw
these types of programs as a possible threat-the effects of social disintegration combined with
increased community organization could cause mounting political opposition. This led the
regime to concern itself with the provision of certain services to help eliminate the most extreme
poverty. Nonetheless, large sectors of poor still suffered because the criteria were very strict in
determining who was to receive benefits. 16
With such high social costs, how did this neoliberal program gain popularity and
acceptance in Chile? Harvey argues that under democratic regimes this requires a transformation
of ideologies within civil society by capturing sectors of the media and converting intellectual
elites to neoliberal ways of thinking. For the Pinochet regime, it was most important to gain
support from the dominant economic class that had supported him in the coup; this was
accomplished through giving them access to policy-making arenas and eliminating regulatory
Valdes, 22; Spooner, 106.
Har vey. 65.
15 Marcus Taylor, From Pinochetto the Third Way ': Neoliberalism and Soc ial Transformation in Chile (London :
Pluto Press. 2006.)
16 Har vey. 76 ; Taylor 80-82.
13
14
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barriers to the form ation of financial conglomerates, banks and firms under the same umbrella. I ?
Through political repression, notably the elimination of the opposition by torture and
disappearances, Pinochet created an environment of fear where few dared speak out against the
government or its policies. 18 Also , although many businesses suffered due to certain neoliberal
policies such as tariff reduction, memories of class conflict and mass labor militancy under the
Allende regime prevented them from protesting these measures. 19
By 1980, the Chilean economy was showing evidence of neoliberalism 's effects.
Inflation had finally fallen to only 31.2%. The economy exhibited positive growth from 1978
1980. Per-capita income had returned to 1970s levels. However, unemployment continued to be
high at 12.5% (1979) , not including those who worked menial jobs under the regime's minimum
employment program or those active in the informal econorny.i" Notwithstanding, on the surface
the Chilean neoliberal restructuring seemed to be a success, despite the fact the richer were
getting richer while the poor were driven deeper into poverty. Pinochet decided to take
advantage of his economic "accomplishments" by institutionalizing his power. When the military
junta took power in 1973, it suspended the Constitution of 1925. After seven years ruling Chile,
Pinochet decided to draft a new constitution.
Part of the 1980 Constitution focused on the "Seven Modernizations," which in addition
to labor relations, agrarian reform, political decentralization and judicial procedure, targeted
social welfare institutions, including education. Taylor observes that the main tenets of this
program were to promote the neoliberal ideals of individualization, privatization and
decentralization, opening new prospects to earn profits and at the same time removing the central
17 Bruce R. Scott and Jes sica Leight, " Ch ile : The Conundrum of Inequality ," Harvard Business Sch ool Case Study,
(Bosto n: Harvard Bus iness School Publishing, 2007 hlt p://ww w.h bsp .har vard .cdu,): 6.
18 Taylor, 40 ; Scott and Leight, 6.
19 Spooner, 148.
20 Ibid , 145.

7

government as the target of social movements by eliminating its responsibility for social welfare

institutions." This can be seen in the reforms enacted to the education system. A dual privatepublic education system was created whose goal was to reduce the role and expanse of the state
and involve the private sector to encourage greater efficiency. The system was decentralized and
administrative responsibility passed down to the municipal level. The other major change in
education policy was a shift to a demand-side approach. Instead of direct funding, schools would
receive a "voucher"- a quantity of money per enrolled student. Therefore, schools received
more money if they attracted more students, supposedly providing incentives for schools to
improve quality. The system was also semi-privatized: the state started providing public funding
for privately owned schools, known as particulares subvencionados (subsidized private schools).
This allowed for-profit businesses (as well as non-profit foundations) to compete for student
enrollment while receiving public funds." It was at this point that the education system became
characterized by three main types of schools, summarized in Table 1.1.
e
T a bill
Ch arac t ens f lCS 0 fthree mam ttypes 0 fChil ean pnmary an d secon dary sc h00 s.
Type of School
Municipal

Source of Funding
State voucher, municipal budget

Type of Administration
Municipalities

Subsidized
Private
Unsubsidized
Private

State voucher; starting in 1993 schools could
also charge supplemental tuition
Tuition

Private foundations , corporations ,
individuals , churches, etc.
Private foundations , corporations ,
individuals, churches, etc.

The voucher system is among one of the most popular methods of educational
privatization researched. Theory explaining the benefits and losses of privatizing education and
specifically programs such as the voucher system are outlined by Henry M. Levin and center on
four criteria: freedom of choice, efficiency, equity and social cohesion . As in the Chilean case,
advocates of privatization emphasize that it enables parents to choose a school that is in line with

21
22

Tayl or, 85
Ibid , 89-90.

8

their religious, moral and political outlooks, as well as based on educational quality. Proponents
also argue that privatization leads to greater efficiency, producing better results given the same
resources. However, when it comes to equity , opponents of privatization contend that it creates
inequalities in opportunities, resources and results. Advocates counter with the opposite
argument; a competitive market will create incentives for schools to fully meet the needs of all
students. The final criteria is social cohesion, or the ability for schools to provide a common
educational experience for students of different backgrounds to learn to accept shared social,
economic and political institutions of a particular country. There are doubts as to whether
schools that compete for students based on private goals (which in the case of Chile include
profit) can achieve this goal."
The Pinochet administration did not set providing a high quality education to the masses
as a goal. Its economic plan, focusing on the export of raw materials such as copper, did not
require a well educated population. Public education was not considered a public good, and
therefore the central government took little responsibility , besides minimal funding, to supply it.
Despite the drastic reorganization of the education system, Taylor argues that during the
authoritarian period, the most harmful effects came from the decrease in educational spending.
The real value of the monthly per-pupil voucher dropped throughout the 1980s , from over 13,000
pesos (1996 pesos) in 1980 to a low of around 8,000 pesos in 1988. 24 The voucher amount was
supposed to be indexed to inflation, but after the 1982 financial crisis, it was not. The decrease
was felt throughout the education system-from the drying up of school resources to a sharp

Henry M. Levin, ed . Privatizing Education: Can the Marketplac e Deliver Choice, Efficiency , Equity and Social
Cohesion ? (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2001), 9.

23

Martin Conroy and Patrick 1. McEwan, "Privatization and Vouchers in Chile and Colomb ia," in Henry M. Levin,
Ed. Privatizing Education : Can the Marketplace Deliver Choice, Efficiency, Equity and Social Cohesion ?
(Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 200 I), 151. In US dollars, this would equal a drop from around $30.58 to $18.82
us ing the 1996 exchange rate (425 pesos to $1).
24

9

decline in teachers' wages." It is hard to measure the effects of decentralization and privatization
of education during the 1980s because the drastic reduction in funding had its own devastating
effects that very well could have masked the outcome of the reforms. Also, the results of student
performance on the standardized test Programa de Evaluacion def Rendimiento Escofar (PER),
were not widely published, and the test was only given from 1982-1985, due to budget restraints.
Results from the Sistema de Evaluacion de Calidad de fa Educacion (SIMCE) are more widely
available. This test replaced the PER in 1988 and is still used today as the main evaluator of
educational quality and performance.

26

However, these two sets of results can not easily be

compared to each other, due to the fact that the SIMCE includes rural schools that consistently
perform at a lower level than urban schools.
Cristian Cox recognizes the difficulty

In

analyzing and companng these two sets of

results . However, it is valuable to at least acknowledge that when comparing fourth grade test
results from 1982 and 1988, the percentage of correct answers dropped among both municipal
and subsidized private schools by an average of 3 points in Math and 6.5 points in Spanish. In
unsubsidized private schools, the percentage of correct answers increased .2 points in both Math
and Spanish. Cox sustains that when observing results from only the schools that were analyzed
at the beginning and end of the 1980s (excluding rural schools that were newly assessed in
1988), the general tendency towards the reduction in scores is maintained. He concludes that "it
seems a conservative hypothesis to sustain that the learning results did not improve throughout
the decade.,,27

Taylor, 91.
Conroy and McEwan, 155.
27 Cristian Cox, "Las politicas educacionales de Chile en las ultimas dos decadas del siglo XX," in Cristian Cox, Ed.
Politicas educacionales en el camb io de siglo: La reforma del sistema escolar de Chile (Santiago : Ed itorial
Universitaria,2005).
25

26
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Despite the lack of quality results, another general trend observed is that families tried to
send their children to subsidized private schools instead of public schools. Enrollment at this
type of school increased from 16% in 1981 to around 35% in 1990, while the share of public
school enrollment fell from around 78% in 1981 to 59% in 1990, and traditional unsubsidized
private school enrollment remained constant at less than 10%.28 However, just because parents
chose to enroll their children in private subsidized schools does not mean that the
implementation of the voucher program or the creation of subsidized private schools increased
the quality of education. Ann Matear argues that in practice, the "free choice" that parents were
supposed to have over their children's education was constricted by physical limitations on
school capacity, unequal access to information regarding school performance and the segregation
of Santiago by income. As noted above, results from the PER were not available to parents, so it
was difficult to judge the quality of a school. Many parents were unwilling to send small children
across the city on public transportation to be able to attend a better school. Because the best
schools were (and still are) located in the richer neighborhoods in Santiago, parents from highersocioeconomic levels did not face this obstacle." In reality, the freedom of choice only existed
for those who were able to pay for it. As will be seen , many of these patterns continued after the
transition to democracy as well.
Alejandra Mizala and Pilar Romaguera contend that despite the numerous investigations
on the quality of a private versus public education, the majority of studies do not take into
account the characteristics of the students, such as socio economic level or parents' educational
level, when comparing results. Raw data from the 1988-1989 SIMCE tests, testing fourth and
eighth graders in Math and Spanish show that subsidized private schools outperformed municipal
Chilean Ministry of Education in Conroy and McEwan, 156.
Ann Matear, "Equ ity in education in Ch ile: The tensions between policy and practice," International Journal of
Educational Development, Vol. 27, Issue 1 (January 2007): 104.

28

29

11

schools by seven points among fourth graders and five points among eighth graders, while
unsubsidized private schools outperformed municipals by twenty-seven points and eighteen
points, respectively. Mizala and Romaguera note that when it comes to these results, "the point
of discussion is to what extent these differences are attributable to differences in teaching
methods of the different schools, and how much is attributable to the characteristics of the
students. ,,3o In their econometric study, Mizala and Romaguera conclude that when

SOCIO-

economic level is kept constant, the performance differences between municipal public schools
and subsidized private schools was not statistically significant."
These results show that one of the most important indicators of educational performance
is socio-economic level, and that the introduction of these new reforms did not correct the low
performance of students from the lowest income quintiles. During the 1980s, education remained
segregated along socio-economic divisions. In 1990, students from the lowest income quintile
made up 41.9% of municipal enrollment, 25.8 % of subsidized private school enrollment, and
only 4% of unsubsidized private schools. In comparison, students from the highest quintile
composed only 4.9% of municipal school enrollment, 11 .3% of subsidized private schools and a
whopping 67% of unsubsidized private schools. 32
The evaluation of student performance during the 1980s can not only be seen as a
function of the new reforms. Although the neoliberal policies implemented by the Chicago Boys
represented a radical change in educational philosophy, the decrease in funding for education
also affected education quality . As discussed above, the "Seven Modernizations" program called
for a cut in social funding, but this was exacerbated by the global financial crisis. In 1982, an
30
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economic recession due to sharp increases in oil prices affected the entire world, but Latin
America was hit especially hard. The Chicago Boys' policies did not insulate Chile from
plunging into crisis as well. The contraction of the world economy hurt exports, especially
copper. Unemployment surged to 30% and the Central Bank lost 45 % of its international
reserves. v' As a result, the first team of Chicago Boys was dismissed and replaced by a new
team . Valdes characterizes the 1982-1984 period as a time of unstable economic decisions,
significantly departing from the neoliberal model , including the devaluation of the peso and daily
exchange rate adjustments and government intervention in five privately owned banks.

34

He

argues that Chile maintained the free market model due to interventions by the IMF and World
Bank in 1983 that restructured Chile's foreign debt through a $760 million loan. The
conditionality of these international lending institutions followed neoliberal theory, calling for
minimal state intervention and austerity measures including reduction in state social spending.
For this reason, care was not taken to re-index the educational voucher to inflation and the real
value dropped throughout the 1980s as discussed above.
The current education system is still based on the decentralized model established by
Pinochet's "Seven Modernizations," following the Chicago Boys ' neoliberal economic reforms.
However, important reforms were carried out during the 1990s after the transition to democracy.
The current education system in Chile is both a legacy of reforms carried out by the democratic
regimes of the 1990s and the basic model established under the authoritarian regime. The LOCE
ensured that major structural changes to the model would be dependent on an unattainable
quorum in Congress. Therefore, the 1990s reforms sought to modernize and improve the system
while maintaining the same basic framework.
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1.2 The 1990s: Attempts to patch the system through reform
The democratic transition in Chile occurred after Pinochet was defeated
plebiscite.

Patricio Aylwin from

the opposition Coalition of Parties for

In

the 1988

Democracy

(Concertacion de Partidos por fa Democracia) beat the dictatorships ' candidate and became
president in a subsequent election held in 1989. However, due to the fact that there was a gap of
time between the elections and when Aylwin took power, Pinochet was able to enact legislation
authorizing him and the military to maintain power and future making drastic reforms difficult.
The LOCE was part of this strategy, severely limiting changes to the fundamental model of the
education system. These restrictions, plus the Aylwin administration 's desire to maintain a stable
transition to democracy and macroeconomic performance, resulted in the perseverance of
"authoritarian enclaves" within the democratic political system that not only affected education,
but the quality of democracy in Chile . This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Four.
Matear notes that during the period 1990-2003 the education reforms enacted sought to
improve the quality of education in order to promote economic growth and social cohesion.
Despite slight improvements in the overall quality of education during this period, the
achievement gap between socioeconomic groups actually increased. There are both endogenous
(inappropriate teaching methods, irrelevant curriculum and overcrowding) and exogenous (low
levels of cultural capital , poverty and low aspirations) factors that can lead to inequaliry."
According to Matear, the most important determinant of educational inequity is the growing
tension between policies that intend to promote equity and a market-oriented education system
that is not designed to support policies straying from the neoliberal model. It is quite clear that
certain policies enacted during this period-such as increased educational spending-obviously
strayed from the neoliberal model. However, it is true that reform mainly focused on endogenous
35
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factors to improve education inside the public-private decentralized model. In spite of Matear's
grim view of education reform, some improvements were implemented during the 1990s.
In his overview of educational reforms of the 1990s, Cox divides them into three
categories: Policy, Labor and Financing Conditions; Programs of Pedagogic Improvement and
Renovation; and Curricular and Length Reform. The first category is the most legally
regulated-ehanges are subject to votes in the National Congress and therefore must be the result
of agreements between the governing coalition and the opposition. Any constitutional change,
such as the revocation or reform of the LOCE, would fall under this category. No changes of this
type were implemented during the 1990s. The second category includes interventions to directly
address pedagogic improvement and equity of learning. These types of reforms are easier to pass,
because they signify additional programs in which schools choose to voluntarily participate, and
operate within the already existing system. The third category includes policies that refer to
learning quality, such as curriculum changes and increases in the length of the school day. These
changes are system-wide and mandatory, and in general were approved at the end of the 1990s
when the legislature was more open to more "controversial" reforms.

36

Cox also divides the reforms of the 1990s into three time periods that roughly follow the
presidencies of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) , Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and Ricardo Lagos
(2000-2006). Cox 's first time period covers 1990-1995 and he characterizes it as providing
fundamental conditions for the better functioning of the scholarly system. Important reforms
enacted during this first period include Program-900, MECE-Basica and Media, the 1993
Shared-Funding Law, and Estatuto Docente (Teaching Statute) Nos. 1 and 2.
Being the first democratically elected president after the dictatorship, Patricio Aylwin
faced many challenges in terms of education reform. His goal was to promote equity within the
36
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mixed public-private system, as well as overcome severe deficits caused by the decreasing real
value of the education voucher under the authoritarian regime, resulting in extreme public under
spending on education. His overall economic strategy was to promote "growth with equity;" this
was reflected in his economic reforms that maintained the fund amental model established by
Pinochet but increased funds for education.Y One of the greatest accomplishments of his
administration was a redefinition of the role of the state in education. Under Pinochet, the state
was considered a " subsidizer" of education. Aylwin redefined this role to that of a " promoter" of
education, recognizing the states responsibility to provide education as a public good to benefit
all of society."
In 1990, statistics on the quality of education were devastating. On average, it took 10.8
years to complete the 8 year primary school cycle, and 5.4 years to complete 4 years of high
school. This obviously represented inefficiencies in a system that was supposed to promote
efficiency. Access to education was also biased based on socio-economic level , especially on the
high school level. Less than 75% of students in the lowest income quintile attended high school,
compared to around 95% of the highest quintile. Other problems included an outdated
curriculum, low compensation for teachers and high failure and drop-out rates. 39 Aylwin had a
difficult task ahead of him. As mentioned, he targeted public investment toward education in
order to improve teaching and learning quality . State educational spending increased
unequivocally from 1990-2000. During this period the education budget more than tripled, from
US $940.3 million in 1990 to US $3.02 billion in 2000. Educational spending as percent of GDP
also increased from 2.6% to 4.3 % over the same time period, with GDP itself increasing 6%
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during the decade. As a result, teacher compensation also increased between 145-170% in real
terms. In spite of these gains, Taylor remains skeptical of increases in educational spending,
sustaining that it merely represents escalation from an extremely low starting point and that the
increases have had ambiguous effects on educational and socioeconomic inequality.l''
Private spending on education also increased starting in 1993 as a result of the SharedFunding Law. This reform has permitted subsidized private primary and secondary schools and
municipal secondary schools to charge parents a supplementary monthly fee in addition to the
voucher they receive from the state. Leader of the Chicago School, Milton Friedman, was one of
the first to advocate a voucher-style approach to funding education, hence its implementation as
part of the Chicago reforms of the 1980s. However, Friedman's vision included a fairly small
publicly-funded voucher that could be augmented by family contributions. In Chile, the state
remained the primary provider of funds for education until this policy change in 1993. By 2000,
1,530 schools had implemented this policy, representing about 30% of the students in the
subsidized system. Approximately 93 % of subsidized private schools had started charging a
monthly tuition, while only 7% of municipal schools had joined the program."
After an initial boom in the founding of publicly subsidized private schools in the 1980s
following the introduction of the voucher program, the number of these types of schools
remained fairly constant from 1985-1994. From 1994-2001 more than 800 subsidized pri vate
schools were founded , clearly due to the profit incentives provided by the shared funding law. As
a result, matriculation at these schools increased from 32.5% to 36 .6% of the student population
from 1995-2001 , as enrollment in public schools fell . Students from the highest income quintiles
started attending private schools more; their attendance at public schools dropped from 18% to
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11 % from 1990-2000.

42

Matear and Taylor concur that this structural change improved

pedagogical quality overall, but increased polarization and inequality between schools. To try to
combat this effect, a system of scholarships per establishment was enacted in 1998 for subsidized
private schools. Depending on enrollment and tuition costs, schools were obligated to admit a
certain percentage of scholarship students. While improving on the original plan, these means
were not sufficient and inequality persisted.Y
Matear worries that the trends towards preferences for private schools hurts the reputation
of municipal schools. In Santiago, less than 30% of respondents to a public opinion poll in 1992
preferred to publicly educate their children. Municipal schools educate the poorest sectors of
society . By 2000, 80.9% of students that attended these schools were from the bottom half of
income earners, and as noted above, students from the highest income quintiles attend private

schools." The small percentage that do attend municipal schools do so in the rich municipalities
such as Las Condes or Provedencia, which can afford to provide a higher quality public
education. Although parents from the lowest income levels undoubtedly aspire to send their
children to publicly-subsidized private schools (unsubsidized private schools are out of the
question due to exorbitant costs) they often can not afford to pay the fees that these schools are
now allowed to charge. Even if they could pay the tuition, the schools employ admissions
policies that discriminate against low-income students that could put the school at risk for lower
test scores. Overall, the shared funding law has benefited middle-income students whose parents
are able to pay the extra fee that provides more resources for a higher quality education. The
prestige of municipal schooling, never high to begin with, has dropped considerably threatening
to turn these schools into "dumping grounds" for poor or low-performing students.
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However, school type is not the best indicator of student performance. Instead , as Matear,
Levin and

Mizala and

Romaguera have

calculated, socio-economic

level

determines

performance on standardized tests. In other words, low income students who attend subsidized
private schools do not perform better than low income students at municipal schools. Middle
income students actually have performed better at municipal schools than at subsidized private

schools." This means that private subsidized schools, despite more funding , are not
compensating for lower-income students' social disadvantages in their home and community
environment. The results also implicate that municipal schools are "achieving more with less,"
speaking well to the Improvement Programs aimed at the lowest performing (usually municipal)
schools and demonstrating that private schools are indeed not necessarily more efficient than
publicly administered schools.l"
During this first period a strong educational base was formed by focusing public
investment on infrastructure, advancing teaching methods and providing up to date technology
through the Improvement Programs. These were voluntary programs with universal reach that
invited any school to implement them as well as programs that focused on the most
"educationally vulnerable" and rural schools. As Cox notes, by the end of this period the days
when a classroom contained nothing more than a blackboard and chalk were gone." MECEBasica was a universal program that targeted primary school to improve classroom effectiveness,
curriculum reform and higher quality teaching resources. It provided materials such as classroom
libraries and text books, while also training teachers in modern instruction and management

methods."
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Improvement in learning quality did not come from rigid curricular standards
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imposed from above. Instead, schools were expected to come up with their own initiatives and
projects (called Projects of Educative Improvement, PMEs) to receive funding. This strategy of
school improvement has since been institutionalized by the Ministry of Education as a way for
schools to receive more funding and improve pedagogical quality at the same time .
The program was jointly funded by the Chilean government and a loan from the World
Bank. Under the administration of Aylwin's successor, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, the program
was expanded to the high school level under MECE-Media. Taylor criticizes the participation of
the World Bank, arguing that it emphasized the neoliberal model of selectivity, privatization,
decentralization and compensation." However, the Chilean government did not show any signs
of moving away from the model established by the authoritarian regime, but rather worked to
enact reforms within this framewor k. For this reason, accepting World Bank funds did not
impose any new limits to the education system.
The Aylwin administration also sought to improve the poorest schools through focalized
reforms. Programa-900 (P-900) targeted the 900 most "educationally vulnerable" schools in
Chile's urban areas. Vulnerability was assessed through student performance on the SIMCE, the
average socio-economic level of the enrollment, location and number of grades taught. As for the
MECE programs, funding was dependent on the development of a PME to outline how the funds
would be used to increase student performance. This program had largely positive effects. Beller
observes that in general, P-900 schools improved their SIMCE points relative to similarly
vulnerable schools that did not choose to participate in the program as well as improving their
SIMCE rankings among all subsidized schools. He does contend, however, that the program was
more successful in its first two years (1990-1992) and among schools with an average SIMCE
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score lower than 60 points (on a scale of 100). A similar program targeting vulnerable rural
schools called MECE-Rural had comparable results.

50

Another reform enacted during this first period that falls under the category of Policy,
Labor and Financing Conditions were two Teaching Statutes. The first Statute was passed in
1991, and as a systematic reform was one of the most controversial reforms of the entire period,
dividing the cabinet of President Aylwin and subject to sharp opposition in Congress. It created
unique labor rules for teachers, removing them from the Work Code that applied to private
industry workers. The statute established national regulation for working conditions, a common
and improved compensation structure, a system of bonuses and high job security. This last
element was highly criticized by the opposition, who saw increased difficulty in firing teachers
or school directors as contrary to the liberal theory behind the education system and strongly
believed that it would lead to inefficiencies that the system sought to evade. This indeed
happened, and in 1996 Teaching Statute No.2 was passed, allowing more flexibility in the hiring
and firing of teachers, and correcting the structural financial disequilibrium."
The second period of democratic educational reform, 1995-2000, coincided with the
administration of Eduardo Frei Ruiz- Tagle, and ushered in a new focus on curricular and school
day length reforms, while maintaining the base of programs started by Aylwin. Cox contributes
the success of educational reforms in Chile to the fact that one has built on the base of another,
providing continuity and consistency. For example, an Improvement Program called Enlaces,
enacted during Frei' s administration to provide computers and educational networks to schools,
would not have been effective without the prior implementation of the MECE programs.
Nonetheless, glaring gaps in educational quality remained despite these reforms.
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the curriculum in use in Chile was outdated and required
changes to be able to prepare students to live in the modern world while maintaining a national
identity. The LOCE allowed schools to create their own curriculums while conforming to the
minimum standards set by the Ministry of Education. These curriculums then had to be approved
by the Consejo Superior de Educaci6n (CSE). Although the curriculum changes of the 1990s
could not get rid of the freedom that the LOCE established, only 14% of schools exercised this
right as of 2001. The vast majority adhered to the Ministry of Education's improved curriculum,
but this curriculum was still weak.
Under Pinochet, the educational curriculum was considered irrelevant to economic
performance, because he did not value education as a public good that would benefit all of
society. Thus, the lack of an adequate and high quality curriculum created " unreliable
foundations for continued growth .,,52 Cox summarizes that in general terms, during the 1990s
changes to the standards set by the Ministry of Education were determined by "the necessity to
respond to outside demands of society to the education system .t''" Skills emphasized in the new
curriculum included: the ability of abstraction, systemic thinking, experimentation and " learning
to learn," communication and group work, problem resolution, the management of uncertainty
and adaptation to change. 54 These abilities were deemed essential for successful participation in
the Chilean society and economy. The new curriculum for primary school was implemented in
1996, followed by that for secondary school in 1998.
The Jornada Escolar Completa (Full School Day , JEC) policy was implemented during
this second period of reform as well. This policy came under sharp criticism from the student

52 Ruth Aedo-Richmond and Mark Richmond, "Recent Curriculum Change in Post-Pinochet Chile," Compare: A
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movement. Prior to this law, as in many Latin American countries, Chilean schools typically ran
two shifts; half attended in the morning and half in the afternoon. In Chile, this half day meant
six scholarly hours of forty-five minutes each totaling a 4.5 hour school day. The lEC increased
the school day to eight scholarly hours, making the school day six hours long, and eliminated the
two shifts. This was good for teachers because it decreased the hours that they had to be at
school teaching classes and left more time for planning and professional development. Also, it
aimed to improve learning and achieve better equity. Lower income students generally have
different "social linguistic codes" and it takes more time for them to adapt to a school
environment than children from higher incomes or who have educated parents. As Cox notes,
lower income students can not count on a "learning space" in their homes and therefore will
benefit from more time spent at school.i"
However, this meant a serious investment in terms of infrastructure for the Chilean state
due to the fact that, in theory, some schools would now have to handle twice the amount of
students. To address this, the state provided a 30% larger voucher for schools with lEe. It also
allocated non-voucher educational funding towards creating better infrastructure for this
program. To enter the lEC program, schools must first have the infrastructure, equipment and
personnel necessary to accommodate all students and a Learning Project outlining how the extra
hours would be used. Revisions to the law in 2004 extended the time by which all schools
receiving state vouchers would have to implement the lEC; municipal and "vulnerable"
subsidized private schools would have to start by 2007, and the rest of the private subsidized
schools by 2010.
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The students' main complaints about the lEC were that the Learning Projects
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were not effective-they spent more time learning the same subjects instead of receiving
instruction in less traditional areas such as foreign language, art , computation or technology.
The 1990s encompassed the first two periods of educational reform under democracy.
However, as Chile moved into the twenty-first century, its policy makers and public began to
realize that although an important first step, the educational reforms of this decade were not
enough. National test scores widely showed that the lowest socio-economic groups were still
performing much lower than their peers in the highest socio-economic levels, and that overall
test scores had not increased. However, what really caught the attention of the Chilean public
were international test results that showed Chile lagging way behind the international average.
Chapter Two will describe the third period of educational reform and show how the educational
crisis contributed to the explosion of student mobilization and protest in May and June 2006.
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Chapter Two
Educational Crisis and Protest
In Chile, the beginning of the twenty-first century meant that it was time to see whether a
decade worth of reforms to Pinochet's neoliberal educational model would "pass the test ,"
literally and figuratively . For the most part it failed . Performance on standardized tests was not
improving, and disparities in access to high quality primary and secondary education were
stagnant or worsening. Students and teachers recognized this educational crisis, but it took
700 ,000 students mobilizing in the streets and at their schools to draw the attention of the
goverrunent to the emergency affecting its nation 's future.

2.1 The Current Educational Crisis
The first two periods of education reform as defined by Cristian Cox were discussed in
Chapter One. The third period started during the second half of 2000, when results of the SIMCE
and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (T IMSS) tests were released , and
signal s the beginning of the current educational crisis in Chile. The Chilean goverrunent realized
that as a whole, the educational system was performing way below standards to be competitive in
a globalized world.
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The public was shocked to find that Chilean students scored 50-70% lower

on this test than Chilean GOP predicted, and well below the international averager" As detailed
above, Chile had just enacted an entire decade of reforms, but the results did not reflect these
efforts. Maria-Jose Ramirez analyzed the math scores from the TIMSS, and blamed poor
performance on the fact that compared to other countries with similar economic profiles, Chilean
students had parents with fewer years of schooling, the Chilean mathematics curriculum covered
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less content, and the meager official curriculum had weaker implementation. 59 Also , results on
the TIMSS demonstrated the inequality in education between socio-economic groups. Those able
to afford an unsubsidized private education outperformed their peers at municipal and subsidized
private schools due to stronger curriculums and more resources to execute them. 6o
Cox argues that according to the social and political view of education, quality matters
more than equity due to the fact that Chileans focus more on performance within their social
group rather than how certain policies affect the population as a whole. However, according to
the student movement, as well as the Colegio de Profesores (Chile's only Teachers' Union) the
current educational crisis is more complex. Grounded in three main themes, the first is a crisis of
poor quality. Despite slight improvements during the first half of the 1990s that shrunk the gap
between municipal and unsubsidized private school performance, the SIMCE results have shown
almost no improvement since 1996, and the achievement gap has once again widened. 6 1 To some
extent, this less than stellar performance on the SIMCE throughout the 90s can actually be
attributed to improvements in education; more students from low-income families attended
school and stayed enrolled for longer. These types of students, who in earlier periods tended to
drop out before taking these exams, are now performing lower than their peers, in turn
decreasing aggregate test scores.l" However, as shown by the TIMSS , despite slight
improvements, the quality of education as a whole in Chile is poor and has shown little
improvement.
Secondly, there is a crisis of inequality. Currently Chile has almost universal coverage of
primary and secondary school, but the student movement asserts that a high quality education is
Maria-Jose Ramirez, "Understand ing the low mathem at ics achievement of Chilean students : A cross-nat ional
analysis using TMSS data ," International Journal of Educational Research 45 (2006) : 102.
60 Ibid .
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only available for those who can afford to pay for it. Although test results among the poorest
15% of students increased over the course of the 1990s, mostly due to the specialized programs
discussed in Chapter One , the truth is that students from higher socio-economic levels still
outperform their peers from lower socioeconomic levels . The 2006 SIMCE testing students in
tenth grade shows that the highest socio-economic quintile outperformed the lowest socio
economic quintile by 78 points in Spanish and 109 points in Math. 63 Also , access to higher
education is still very limited depending on socio-economic level , one of the main complaints of
the student movement. As of the year 2000, only 10% of students from the lowest socio
economic quintile were enrolled in post-secondary institutions, compared to 65 % of the highest
socio-economic quintile." As will be shown in Chapter Three, access to higher education in
Chile is essential for social mobility.
Directly related to the theme of inequality, the third element is the crisis of social
segmentation among schools. Students in Chile attend schools with peers from the same socio
economic level, and this phenomenon has deepened since 1990. Although officially three types
of schools exist in Chile (municipal, subsidized private and unsubsidized private), the student
movement argues that in practice, five types are defined by exclusivity, divided according to
socio-economic level. In addition to the three publicly recognized, the student movement
distinguishes between municipal schools from poor neighborhoods and municipal schools from
rich neighborhoods as well as subsidized private schools with and without shared funding.f The
OECD report on Chile 's Educational policy illustrates this "educational apartheid" using data
from the 2001 SIMCE of fourth grade students:
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about 80% of enrolment coming from the low and low middle groups (42 % of the
total), have mothers who did not complete their education, family incomes
ranging from CLP 100,000 to 130,000 per month and attend municipal education;
the middle group (37% of total enrolment), is divided almost equally between
municipal and private subsidised education (47.6% and 52.3% , respectively), and
their mothers have 11 years of education, while family income is almost CLP
200 ,000 per month. The high middle and high income groups study primarily in
private schools, be these subsidised or paid, and show substantial educational and
income differences compared to the rest. 66
In fact, according to SIMCE results from 2006, all students from the highest socio-economic
quintile were enrolled in unsubsidized private schools." Supposedly, "free choice" allowed
parents to choose the highest quality school, but as in the 1980s, a lack of information on test
scores, discriminatory admissions policies, and geographical limits prevent this.
The tri-part crisis of quality, inequality and segmentation can mainly be contributed to the
1980 Chilean constitution (discussed in Chapter One) , the Organic Constitutional Law of
Education (Ley Orgdnica Constitucional de Educacion, LaCE), the Law of Municipalization
and the Law of Subsidies. The main problem with the LaCE is that it prioritizes the "freedom of
education" over education as a human right. This essentially means that the law holds the
freedom to educate-to establish schools that profit from state vouchers-higher than the right to
a quality public education. In other words, the LaCE has transformed education into a lucrative
business that in many cases sacrifices educational quality. Despite setting minimal curricular
requirements, it permits the owners of the school ample freedom to use the subsidies as they see
fit, and does not provide for the sufficient monitoring of curriculum quality, teaching or
educational infrastructure. It also allows discriminatory selection of students based on socio
economic level or learning ability . Subsidized private schools are often for-profit businesses, and
for this reason have more incentive to enroll better performing students because they are cheaper
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to educate. This means that lower-performing and poorer students are forced to attend public
schools administered by the municipality, which are often under funded and of poorer quality.
The LOCE is supposed to allow parents to choose where to send their child to school , but really
it has come down to the school choosing the child . 68
The problem with the Law of Municipalization is that the majority of municipalities in
Chile are not well-equipped to manage a public education system. In fact , of the 345
municipalities in Chile , only thirty-two have specialized teams in charge of administering the
public schools of their municipality. MINEDUC does not provide adequate monitoring to make
sure that municipalities offer a high-quality education or use the resources provided effectively.
Municipalization also leads to inequality, in that some municipalities, such as those in the
northeastern parts of Santiago, are richer and can provide a better quality education than those
found in the poorer sectors. Here, the Law of Subsidies also comes into play . As of now , the state
provides a flat subsidy , around $CH 32,000 (US$64 .00) per month per student. This means that a
student from the lowest socioeconomic quintile attending a public school receives the same
subsidy as a student from the highest quintile attending a subsidized private school with shared
funding . The subsidy does not cover the entire cost of educating a student, especially one with
lower social capital. For this reason, all subsidized schools are forced to go to other sources for
funds. In the case of municipal schools, this is the general budget of the municipality. Poor
municipalities cannot supplement the subsidy like rich municipalities or subsidized private
schools do , negatively affecting the quality of education and promoting educational inequality.i"

Antonio Valencia, "i.,Y que d iablos es la LOCE?" La Nacion , 30 May 2006,
http ://www .lanacion.c1/prontus_noticias/site/artic/20060529/pags/20060529210954 .html( 16 November 2007).
69 Mario Villalobos, "T ras la ' Marcha de los Pinguinos ': un a mirada al sistema educacional en Chile ," Temas
Sociales 57 (Octubre 2006) , 6; "La Crisis del Sistema Educativo Chileno" Colegio de Profesores de Chile A.G.,
Centro de Documentaci6n, Santiago, Junio de 2006, 20 .
68

29

Cox contends that this poor performance has led to policies in recent years designed to
" bring the reform to the classroom.v'" These reforms have focused on improvements in teacher
training and more public funding for education departments at Chilean universities. In 2002 the
Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) reformed the primary school curriculum once again, making
standards and expectations much more explicit. It also implemented a system of teacher
evaluation. As mentioned above, the lEC was revised in 2004. However, these reforms were not
enough, and were seen by the students as a "band aid" solution to a crisis requiring major
"surgery" to correct a structural problem. It is in this context that the Revolucion took place in
2006. After a decade of reform, Chilean students expected results in terms of quality as well as
equity .

2.2 The 2006 Revolucion Pingiiina
Student participants of the 2006 mobilizations agree that the movement itself did not
begin in 2006. The four weeks that have come to exemplify the student struggle in Chile were
the result of over a year of organization on the part of the ten emblematic high schools in
Santiago that formed the Coordinating Assembly of Secondary Students (ACES) in 2001.
Emblematic high schools are municipal high schools in Santiago that have traditionally had
better reputations for quality than other municipal schools in Santiago and the rest of the country.
For example, the Instituto Nacional was the first high school founded by the Chilean Republic,
and is the Alma Matter of seventeen Presidents, including Salvador Allende and Ricardo Lagos.
According to Sebastian Vielmas, alumnus of the Liceo de Aplicaci6n, another emblematic high
school, these are schools "where a parent, that wants to put their child in a public high school,

70

Cox , 42 .

30

could do so calmly without expecting that they arrive home stabbed by a classmate.t" This
strong statement represents the common perception that the emblematic high schools are an
"acceptable option," while also revealing the notion that all other municipal schools are
"dumping grounds" for underprivileged or probl em students. Vielmas contends that it was not
surprising that the student movement emerged under the leadership of the emblematic schools,
due to the democratic way in which students organize to make decisions.
The right to student organization is protected by Decree No. 524 of the Ministry of
Education. Students at all high schools can democratically elect course representatives to form
part of the Committee of Course Delegates. Within the Committee a board of directors is elected
known as the Student Center (Centro de Alumnos) , and in the case of the emblematic high
schools, the president of the Student Center represents the entire high school at the ACES.
Although every high school has the right to democratically organize, Vielmas and Sanhueza
contend that prior to 2006, many schools were not exercising this right, or doing so poorly , due
to little support from school administrations or lack of consciousness and inforrnation.f It was
from March to May 2006 that other schools started joining the Assembly , which eventually grew
to include more than 100 high schools. At this point, the ACES divided into five zones within
Santiago, and each of these zones elected a representative to the newly formed National
Assembly of Secondary Students (ANES), including representatives from each region of Chile.
As Vielmas pointed out , the curious thing about both the ACES and the ANES was that neither
ever created or published a legal document establishing itself as an official organization. "
However, it is undeniable the organizational role both groups played before and during the
7\ Sebastian Vielmas (Former President, Student Center , Liceo de Aplicaci6n) in discu ssion with the author , January
2008 , Santiago, Chile.
72 Vielmas and Maria Jesus Sanhueza (Former Spoke sperson, ACES) in discussion with the author, January 2008 ,
Santiago, Chile.
73 Vielmas, in discussion with the author , Janu ary 2008 .
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mobilizations of 2006. They provided leadership, education, and made all official decisions
regarding street protests, strikes, school take-overs, and eventually when to end the major
mobilizations. The ACES elected four spokespeople, Maria Jesus Sanhueza, Karina Delfino,
Cesar Valenzuela and Juan Carlos Herrera. Sanhueza described the spokespeople as having a
"communicational role," to make sure that the public, MINEDUC and the high schools were
familiar with the position of the assembly." They also became the public face of the student
movement.
Starting in November 2005 , student leaders of the ACES came together to dialogue with
the Ministry of Education about the educational crisis in Chile. They published a document ,
diagnosing various problems and detailing proposals to rectify them. The students touched upon
major themes of the educational crisis, including municipalization, the LOCE, the JEC and the
financing of education. They also proposed reform to Decree No. 524 and a renovation of the
Student Centers in many schools, as well as changes to include Sex Education in the curriculum.
This proposal was handed to then Secretary of Education Sergio Bitar, inviting him to review it
with the Secretariat of Education, and to start "systematic and sustained work based on this
proposal during the year 2006.,,75 They also asked to form a working group between student
leaders and functionaries of MINEDUC during the summer of 2005-2006 (December-February
in the Southern Hemisphere). However, during this time presidential elections were held ,
President Michelle Bachelet was elected, and Sergio Bitar left his post to Martin Zilic, along
with the student proposal. Needless to say, the proposal was ignored.
In March, the students began to organize to figure out ways to get their agenda through to
MINEDUC. On 26 April, a peaceful march was held in the capital of Santiago. In less than a
Sanhueza in dis cussion with the author, January 2008 .
" Propuesta de Trabajo de Estudiantes Secundarios de la R.M ." Santiago, 30 de no viembre, 2005,
www .opech.cllb ibl iografico/doc_ movestlfinalccaa.pd f
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month it escalated to include more than 700,000 mostly high school students from more than 100
high schools and almost every major city in Chile. At first , the students ' demands focused on a
"short-term" agenda, highlighting specific educational policies. A brand new transportation
system, known as Transantiago was to be implemented within the next year and the students
protested government-announced restrictions on the use of the student transport pass under the
new plan. The second demand during this preliminary manifestation was a decrease in the price
of the University Selection Test (Pru eba de Seleccion Universitaria; PSU). This test is required
for all students wishing to attend college in Chile. In 2006, the price of the PSU rose to $21 ,000
pesos, approximately US$40, increasing an already high cost barrier for low income students. A
third demand during this initial period focused on expanding the free school lunch program.

. the Reva I UClOn
.. P'i nguina
T a bl e 2 1 T ime rme 0 f events dunng
The ACES submits petition outlining education crisis to MINEDUC
November 2005
26 April 2006
First organized march in Santiago
2000 students attempt to march to MINEDUC, confronted by police, 800
10 May 2006
students arrested
Students from Instituto Nacional and Liceo de Aplicaci6n take over their
19 May 2006
schools, student demands start to focus on " long-term" agenda
In her annual address to the nation, President Bachelet barely acknowledges
21 May 2006
the student movement, prompting more lomas
26 May 2006
30 schools in toma, 70 on strike
700,000 students participate in first national strike, approximately 300
30 May 2006
schools are in toma, and m?re than 100 are on strike, uni versity students join
in support
President Bachelet presents proposal to students that includes the formation
I June 2006
of a Presidential Advisory Committee for Educational Quality (CAPCE),
rejected by the ACES
Second national strike, supported by teachers, labor unions, university
5 June 2006
students
7 June 2006
ACES finally agrees to the formation of the CAPCE
Student leadership within ACES becomes divided, announce end of
9 June 2006
mobi lizations
13 June 2006
Students return to classes
OctoberSome mobilizations continue, but do not have widespread support
November 2006
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During this first manifestation, Minister of Education Martin Zilic expressed willingness
to dialogue with students. However, the students did not leave satisfied and the mobilizations did
not end there. On 7 May, the ACES announced a nation-wide student mobilization to take place
on 10 May . It claimed that despite meetings with the government, no concrete solutions had been
proposed. Maria Jose Sanhueza contended that "the meetings with the Ministry (of Education)
have been dialogues which have not arrived at concrete solution. Because of that, we suggest
continuing with the mobilizations ... until [there is] a negotiation that is favorable to

US.,,76

On 10 May, approximately 2000 students started marching from Plaza Almargo

In

Santiago, attempting to arrive at the Ministry of Education to voice their concerns. However,
they were stalled when confronted by the police, and violence erupted resulting in the arrest of
800 students. By this time, the students' demands had increased to include revisions to the "Full
School Day Policy" (JEC) As previously discussed, students contended that the extra hours of
instruction prescribed by the policy were not being effectively utilized; the law did not specify
how the time was to be used, and students complained that they were receiving "more of the
same," as in more time was being spent on the instruction of traditional subjects, instead of arts ,
foreign language or technology instruction.f It also put a lot of pressure on schools to improve
infrastructure to accommodate many more students at once. For this reason, the revision in 2004
included funds for infrastructure improvements as well as prohibited the expulsion of students
who could not pay in the middle of a school year and implemented fines for schools that did not

"Estudiantes secundarios convocan movilizaci6n nacional para el lOde mayo ," La Tercera , 7 May 2006,
http://www.lercera.cl/medio/articulo/0.0.32555666206743274.00.html.
77 "Jornada Escolar Completa reprueba examen," La Nacion, 30 August 2006, http ://www.lanacion.cl/cgi
bin/print_page_02 .cgi (16 November 2007).
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accept pregnant students or teenage mothers." Despite these improvements, students had not yet
seen concrete changes and continued to find fault with the program .
The government ignored the students' demands, avowing that they would not achieve
anything through street protests. For the next three weeks, mobilizations continued sporadically
throughout the capital city, with little success. However, on 19 May, the students of two of the
emblematic high schools, El Instituto Nacional and Liceo de Aplicaci6n, in the comuna
(neighborhood) of Santiago took over their schools. To take over a school, a group of students
arrived early in the morning and blocked all doors and windows with chairs and desks to prevent
anyone from entering. Once students and teachers started to show up, only fellow students could
come into the school. When all of the students had arrived , a popular vote was held to approve or
refuse the take-over. If the take-over was approved , they started to organize into committees that
took charge of food , security, communication and finances. Students spent the night at the
schools, and in many cases participated in workshops where they would di scuss various topics to
do with the educational crisis.

79

The lomas (take-over) signaled an important turning point in the

mobilizations. By now , students realized that street protesting would not produce the desired
reaction from the government. Guided by the student leaders of ACES, the students changed
their methods to instigate a positive response from the government and re-initiate negotiations.
At this point the student demands amplified to include a "long-term" agenda: the serious
structural reform of the educational system. These demands included the derogation of the
Constitutional Organic Law on Education (LOCE), a legacy of the Pinochet regime that made
education reform difficult. The LOCE became one of the focal points of the students' campaign,

"Publicada de la ley de jornada escolar completa," Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional9 November, 2004 ,
htlp:llwww .bcn.cllactual idad legislativaltemas portada.2005-J 1-04.838579 3738 (16 November 2007).
79 Vania Gonzalez (Current Student, Liceo No. I Para Nif'ias) and Nicolas Vicente (Former stud ent leader, Liceo
Agusto D'Halrnar de Nunoa) in discussion with the author , January 2008, Santiago, Chile .
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reflecting back to the 2005 proposal, and demonstrating a significant divergence from pnor
student protests that only focused on specific short-term policies. Calling for the dissolution of
the LOCE as well as an end to municipalization and the Law of Subsidies demonstrated that they
wanted profound structural change to address the stark inequality in access to a quality
education-reforms that would mainly affect future generations of students. As pre viously
discussed,

by

2006,

various educational

policies

had

been

reformed

by

democratic

administrations to try to improve educational quality . However, the LOCE still existed because it
required a two-thirds vote in the National Congress to overthrow it, and strong right-wing
representation prevented this. However, the ruling coalition, Concertacion, took seats in both the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies from the right-wing Alliance for Chile (Alian za por Chile)
during the December 2005 Parliamentary elections, signaling the first chance at greater
constitutional reform since the transition to democracy .
The students participating in tomas and strikes wanted President Michelle Bachelet to
recognize their demands and address the quality of Chilean education during her speech to the
nation on 21 May .8o However, the students were disappointed to hear only a small and indirect
reference to the mobilizations in the president 's speech to the Congress in Valparaiso. She
chastised the students, saying "what we have seen in recent weeks is unacceptable. I will not
tolerate vandalism, destruction or the intimidation of people! . . ,We won democracy with an
uncovered face , and we must continue that way. ,,8f Nicolas Vicente, student leader of his high
school in the comuna of Nufioa, contends that if Bachelet had acknowledged the students in her

"A lumnos de Instituto Nacional y Liceo de Aplicaci6n se declararon en torna," Radio Cooperativa, 19 May 2006,
ht1p://www .cooperativa.cl/p4 notic ias/s ite/artic/20060519/p ag s/20060519\ 02013 .hlm I (I November 2007) .
81 Michelle Bachelet, "Mensaje Pre sidencial," Speech, 21 May 2006.
http ://www.presiden cia .clldocumentos/men saje-presidencial-archivo s/2 1Mayo2006 .pdf (9 November 2007) .
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speech, perhaps the movement would have taken a very different tum. 82 In the wake of the
President's silence, students at the Instituto Nacional decided to hand the school back to
authorities, and instead began an indefinite strike, announcing that they would not return to
classes until the government authorities recognized the deficiencies within the education system.
They called for non-violence, urging students not to take to the street, hoping to be taken

seriously.f Zilic insisted that the government would not talk to students on strike, a strategy that
proved ineffective as more schools joined the Instituto Nacional and stopped attending classes,
and even more started tomas of their own. On 25 May , twenty-four schools were taken over and
sixteen were on strike. By the next day the situation had exploded-thirty schools were in toma
and over seventy declared strikes across the country. Zilic finally conceded to a dialogue with the
students for 29 May , but the ACES called for a national strike of all Chilean students for the

so".

Karina Delfino of the ACES declared that if during the meeting on the 29 lh "the answers are
favorable ... with respect to

OUf ...

themes ... only in that case will we call off the manifestation. ?"

Zilic did not even show up to the meeting, and instead sent sub-secretary of education
Pilar Romaguera to the meeting. More than 100 students showed up at MINEDUC, but only
twelve were allowed to enter. Disappointed and angry that the government had once again not
taken them seriously, the students confirmed the national strike for the following day.
On 30 May 2006, more than 250 schools throughout the country participated in what has
been called the greatest student protest in thirty years, and the first great challenge of Michelle
Bachelet's presidency. Between 700 ,000 and one million high school and university students
participated as well as teachers and professors. Before the protest, the ACES called for a
Vicente in discussion with the author , January 2008.
"Alurnnos del Institute Nacional depu sieron toma pero comenzaron un paro ," Radio Cooperativa , 22 May 2006,
hnp :!lwww .cooperativa.cl/p4noticias/antialone.htm l?page=htt p://www.co operativa .cl/p4 noticias/s ite/artic/2006 05
22!pags/20060522 I02944 .btml (29 October 2007).
84 "Cerca de I00 mil estudiantes se movilizan y confirman paro nacional para el rnartes ," La Tercera, 26 May 2006.
http://www.ter cera.cl/medio/articulo /0.03255 566 21285 173 6.00.htm I. (29 October 2007).
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peaceful mobilization, highlighting the desire to be taken seriously by the goverrunent.
Unfortunately , provoked by police-launched tear gas and fire hoses directed at protesters, some
students reacted aggressi vely. More than 600 people were arrested. In response, the president
called a meeting of her cabinet and invited twenty-five students to participate in dialogue.
Despite the violence-later confirmed to have been started by police aggression-the students
had managed to get their voices heard, and thus began the process of negotiation. 85
After two days of dialogue while the strikes and tomas continued, President Bachelet
presented a proposal to the students. It included a commitment to establish a Presidential
Advisory Committee on Educational Quality (Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Calidad de

Educacion, CAPCE) to reform the LaCE. She also promised to provide free school transport
passes for the neediest students without restrictions on its use, establish scholarships for the PSU
for 155,000 students (80 % of the poorest in Chile), and expand the free lunch program.l" The
ACES met to consider the proposal. After eight hours of discussion, it rejected the proposal
based on the fact that it did not include a free school transport pass for all students which they
argued was feasible given the high price of copper, Chile's main export and significant source of
state revenue.
On 5 June, another national strike took place. Man y schools peacefully participated by
holding cultural days (jornadas culturalesi inside school grounds with musical performances,
speeches, theater productions and debates about the quality of education in Chile. University
students, professors, and various unions supported the high school students in this strike by
peacefully demonstrating. However, members of the left-wing organization FPMR (Miguel

"Chile: 730 detenidos en la mayor protesta estudiantil en 30 afios," Clarin, 31 May 2006 .
http://www .cl arin .com/diario/2006/05/31/elmundo/i-02001.htm (9 November 2007).
86 "Bache let anuncia profund o plan de educaci6n en medio de rnovilizaciones ," La Tercera, 1 June, 2006.
http ://ww w.ler cera .c l!rned io/art iculo/0 ,0 ,3255 5 GG4 2 14 73 2300.00 .htm I (9 November 2007).
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Rodriguez Patriotic Front) provoked violent protests in the streets, angering the students due to
fears that they would be blamed for the destruction caused by others and hinder the negotiation
process. On 6 June, students from Liceo de Aplicaci6n peacefully occupied the Chilean office of
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to voice their
demands, publicly sending the message to the Chilean government that they were willing to go to
an international organization if it refused to listen to their demands. The students later left
amicably, satisfied by UNESCO's response."
On 7 June, President Bachelet announced that Juan Garcia Huidobro would head the
Presidential Advisory Committee. The ACES communicated that they were in agreement with
the formation of the Committee, but insisted that half the members be chosen by the student
assembly. The government rejected this proposal , stating that the President had the right to
choose the committee. Out of seventy-three posts, the president reserved six for high schools
students and six for college students. On 9 June , after a press conference in which it was obvious
that the student leadership was divided over the issue of the Advisory Committee, the ACES
announced that the mobilizations had officially ended, and after twenty-two days of protests,
students returned to classes on 13 June. 88
Although some mobilizations continued, they did not resemble the strong organization,
cohesiveness and determination as those of May and June 2006. The organization of the protests
was nothing short of incredible-students used cell phones, text-messaging, e-mail and blogs to
communicate with each other, demonstrating the power of new-age communication technologies.
The students were also able to modify their strategies when they realized that the government

"Estudiantes deponen lorna en la sede de la Unesco," El Mercurio, 6 June 2006,
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacionalldetalle/delallenolici as/asp?idnoticia=2213I 0 (9 November 2007).
88 "Secundar ios vuelven acl ases tras 22 dias de movilizacion ," La Tercera , 9 June 2006.
http ://www .tcr ccra .c1/medio/articulo/0.0 .325 5 5666 216 68 930 I,00.hlm I (9 November 2007) .
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would not respond to violent protest and delinquency. Despite the fact that student leaders came
from different political backgrounds from right to left, during early critical moments they were
able to rally around the cause, projecting a united voice to government officials. As will be
discussed in Chapter Four, part y politics eventually infiltrated the movement, and unfortunately
was one of the factors that lead to the weakening of the ACES.
The student movement made clear that structural reforms are needed to address the
division of education system along socioeconomic lines, in turn affecting the quality of education
that poorer students receive. This segregation is not only unfair, but also affects Chile 's
socioeconomic inequality. Despite being a leader in Latin America in terms of economic growth
and development, Chile still remains one of the most unequal societies in terms of income
differences between the richest and poorest quintiles. The next chapter will analyze how
inequalities in the Chilean education system perpetuate inequality in Chilean society, and how
this issue became one of the catalysts for the Revolucion Pinguina.
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Chapter Three
Perpetuating Societal Inequality through Educational Disparity
Undeniably, the students' main issue focused during the mobilizations that I discuss the
previous chapter was the poor quality education system. These next two chapters move beyond
the surface and analyze other background factors that are related to the educational crisis and
student discontent. This chapter will demonstrate how inequalities in the education system
contribute to socioeconomic inequalities in Chilean society. Chapter Four will explore popular
protest in Chilean history and its role in bringing about political change. It will also anal yze
current political attitudes among Chilean youth and how an "apathetic" generation came together
to fuel the reaction that occurred in 2006 over the educational crisis.
Inequality in the Chilean educational system was an important factor when it came to the
student protests. In addition, what lies beneath students ' complaints about an unequal access to
high quality education is discontent with inequality in Chilean society as a whole, and especially
the ways in which the educational system replicates societal inequality by failing to provide an
avenue for social mobility . This chapter first examines socioeconomic inequality in Chile and
demonstrates the difficulty that the majority of the population faces in providing a high quality
education to their children in a market system. Secondly it shows how socioeconomic inequality
is directly linked to education due to the extremely high returns of a university education
compared to the low returns of primary and secondary education. Third, the chapter analyzes
inequality in the education system itself and how this diminishes educational performance both
overall and among lower-income students, limiting access to higher education. Lastl y, a
connection is established between the student movement and the changing political discourse on
socioeconomic inequality .
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3.1 Inequality in Chilean Society

Walking along the tree-lined streets of central and eastern Santiago in the comunas of
Nufioa , Providencia and parts of La Reina and Las Condes, it is hard to imagine that Chile is one
of the most unequal societies not only in Latin America, but in the world. Everyone seems to
belong to the middle or upper-middle classes. The only hints of poverty are the odd beggar or the
old woman selling band aids at a bus stop . However, continue the trajectory to the south or west
and it becomes clear, as the houses get smaller, the apartment buildings shabbier, and one
reaches the shantytowns on the outskirts of the city that perhaps Chile does suffer from
inequality. To really glimpse the stark differences, one must then travel far to the northeastern
part of the city, encroaching upon the cordillera of the Andes, and view the large sprawling
houses of Lo Barnachea with huge lawns, swimming pools, tennis courts, private security guards
and the latest model cars parked in the garage. Santiago itself provides an excellent model for
inequality in Chile. Comunas, or neighborhoods, are generally separated by socio-economic
level. By asking where someone lives , one can determine their socio-economic status with few
exceptions.
Statistics on income distribution also demonstrate this stark inequality. Chile is ranked
among countries with a high human development index (HDI) according to the UN Report on
Human Development, falling in at number 38 world wide. This ranking is based on GDP per
capita, life expectancy, literacy rates, and an education index. Despite this high ranking, the
report also reveals that the richest 10% of the population control 47% of the nation's wealth,
while the poorest 10% control only 1.2%. Chile ranks twelfth from the bottom worldwide in
terms of the UN GIN I index, used to measure inequality of income distribution, with a 57.1.

89

The GINI coefficient runs from 0-1 ; closer to 0 signals a more equal so ciety , clo ser to I signals more inequality .
For reference, Japan has the lowest GIN I with .249, and Namib ia and Lesotho the highest with .743 and .632 ,
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Originally created for marketing purposes, Chilean society

IS

divided into

SOCIO-

economic groups (grupos socioeconomicos, GSE) using a calculation based on information from
the national census. It takes into account income, career, house value, education level and the
number of "goods" owned out of a sample group of ten items.

9o

Currently, these categories are

used to conveniently describe someone's socioeconomic situation. Table 3.1 provides a
description of each GSE for the metropolitan area of Santiago, reflecting the inequality shown in
the above statistics. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of GSE by comuna, ordered by percentage
of ABCI. It demonstrates how the members of ABCI (that only make up 11.3% of the total
population of Santiago) are concentrated in six comunas that virtually exclude all other GSE with
the exception of C2. Group C3 is the most evenly distributed throughout the city with the
exception of the six elite comunas, while Groups 0 and E are for the most part concentrated in
the bottom six comunas on the list that also have the least percentage of the group ABC I.

T able 3..
I GSE ch aractenstics fIor

Greater Santi ago

I e
an d Chil

% of
Average Average
%
population
# years
#
Greater
population
Goods
of
GSE
Santiago
Chile
Monthly Income
owned
education
ASC1*
11.3%
7.2%
$3400-7000 or more
9.2
16.2
C2
20.1%
15.4%
$1200-2400
7.2
14
22.4%
C3
25.6%
$800-1000
5.7
11.6
D
34.5%
34.8%
$400-600
7.7
4.4
E
8.5%
20 .3%
$320 or less
2.3
3.7
*This category could be divided into two groups : AS and C 1. However, AS takes
up only about 2.5% of the entire population and it is often difficult to gain accurate
census data, especially in terms of income, due to its elite status.
Adimark, "Mapa Socioecon6mico de Chile: nivel socioecon6mico de los hogares del pais basados en datos del
Censo," 2002, www.adimark.cl/medios/estudios/Mapa_Socioeconomico_de_Chile .pdf(20 Febuary 2008), 9-13.

respectively. The GINI index is calculated simply by multiplying the coefficient by 100. Source: "Inequality in
Income or Expenditure," Table 15 in Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power Poverty and the
Global Crisis, UNDP (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) , 335-338. Available :
http: //hd r.undp .org/ en/ med ia/hd r06-com plete.pd f
90 Shower, color TV, refrigerator, hot water heater, cable/satellite TV, washing machine, microwave, car , computer
and internet access.
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Table 32
.. Percentages 0 fOSE boy comuna 0 fS antiago, or d ere db..., ABCI
Comunas of
Greater
E
ABC1
C2
C3
D
Santiago
Vitacura
58.6
28 .5
9.8
2.8
0.3
Las Condes
48.6
30.7
12.9
6.8
0.9
Lo Barnechea
43 .2
14.3
14
22.2
6.3
La Reina
40 .6
26.5
13.7
2.7
16.5
Providencia
35.9
38.3
18.2
7
0.6
1.8
Nur'ioa
28.7
35.1
20
14.5
San Miguel
16.1
26.2
26 .1
26.4
5.2
11.9
26
25 .8
29.9
6.5
Macul
11.7
25
6.2
26.5
30.5
La Florida
11.1
14
41 .1
12.5
21 .3
Per'ialolen
11
44 .6
13.7
Huechuraba
9.8
20.9
31.7
24.4
Santiaqo
9.7
29.3
4.9
23.8
La Cisterna
8.7
29.1
31.5
6.8
27 .2
28.6
4
7.5
32.7
Ma ipu
6.2
22.4
30.3
34.6
6.4
Independencia
19.2
9
Estac ion Central
5.7
28.1
38
19.9
31.9
7
Quilicura
4.5
36.6
41.6
Cerrillos
4.3
16.8
26.7
10.6
7.2
Puente Alto
4.3
19.8
31.8
36.9
14.8
42.4
13.2
San Bernardo
4.2
25.5
42 .7
10.4
San Joaquin
3.4
15.5
28
Quinta Normal
3.3
16.1
28.6
41.6
10.3
43 .2
11.5
15.5
26.8
Recoleta
3
14.5
11.3
2.8
28.4
43
Pudahuel
12.6
46.2
12.2
2.6
26.3
EI Bosque
2.6
14.7
27 .8
44.2
10.6
Conchali
2.6
13.4
26 .9
46.1
11
P.A. Cerda
13.3
27.7
45.7
10.9
Lo Prado
2.4
10.9
27.3
46.8
13.3
La Grania
1.6
8.1
51.2
15.9
San Ramon
1.1
23.7
15.3
9.1
24.5
49 .9
1.1
Renca
15.8
7.5
52.7
0.6
23.4
Lo Esoeio
6.4
23.2
52.3
17.5
Cerro Navia
0.6
5
20 .8
54
19.8
La Pintana
0.5
Adimark, " Mapa Socioecon6mico de Chile: nivel socioecon6mico de los hogares del pais basados en datos del
Censo," 2002, www .adimark .cl/medios/estudios/Mapa_Socioeconomico_de _Chile.pdf (20 Febuary 2008), 19-21 .

The OSE are calculated differently from income quintiles that are often used in statistical
analysis. Income quintiles are calculated by ranking households of two persons or more in order
from lowest to highest by their earned income and then arranging the ranked families into five
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equal -numbered groups, or quintiles." Given the fact that each income quintile must have the
same number of households in it, these five groups are more socio-economically diverse than the
GSE, which divides households in terms of economic status, each group representing a different
percentage of the population. Table 3.3 shows the average income for each income quintile in
Santiago for 2003. Looking at data for all of Chile, Quintile I is composed of households from
ABCl and C2, Quintile II of households from C2 and C3, Quintile III of households from C3
and 0, Quintile IV of households from 0 and E and Quintile V is the most homogenous with
only households from group E. 92 As noted in Table 1, the GSE ABCI is already very
heterogeneous, so therefore Quintile I, including ABC 1 plus some households from C2, is the
most diverse quintile, including households that earn from around $2000 a month to the richest
household in Chile. As will be explored later through an analysis of Chile's GINI coefficient, a
large part of Chile's income disparity is found within the richest 20% of income earners,
meaning that being part of Chile's richest quintile does not in and of itself guarantee economic
security.
Table 3.3. Average Monthly Autonomous Income by Income Quintile
Quintile of Autonomous Income
V
I
I II I III I IV I
$148.94
Monthlv Autonomous Income
I 335 .13 I 512.51 I 805 .74 I 2210.84
...
MIDEPLAN , DIVISion Social, Encuesta CASEN 2003 . In US dollars.

Average
802.36

It is starkly obvious that today Chile is an unequal society. But has this always been the
case? From colonial times to the beginning of the twentieth century, like the vast majority of
Latin American countries, Chile was economically controlled by a small landed oligarchy. Its
economy was based on commodity exports from both the mining and agricultural sector. After
Chile 's victory in the 1879 War of the Pacific, it gained large nitrate deposits from land formerly
"Chapter I: Introduction ," Income in Canada, 2002, http://www .statcan.c aJenglish/freepub/75-202
XIE/00002/partl.htm 29 February 2008.
92 Author's own elaboration using GSE data and methodology for calculating income quintiles.

91
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part of Bolivia and Peru. Until the 1930s, nitrates would be Chil e's number one export and
allowed sustained economic growth. Despite the creation of a large demand for labor in the
mining sector, Chile remained a socio-economically unequal society"
At the onset of WWI, synthetic fertilizer was invented causing the nitrate export industry
to seriously suffer and ultimately cease to exist. By 1920, this set off economic crisis in Chile
with large sectors of the population unemployed . This same year, Arturo Alessandri of the
Liberal Party was elected president on the platform of social reform to give into labor demands
partially due to fear of a working class uprising in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia
three years prior. However, by 1924, few changes had been instituted to relieve the economic
depression due to divisions between the President and a Conservative Parliament that prevented
the passing of social reforms. Chile at this time was characterized by sharp divisions, both
political and economic, between the working and upper classes. In a move that would be
repeated approximately fifty years later, the military intervened on 8 September 1924,
demanding that the Parliament pass a budget bill. However, unlike the events in 1973, this
military inter vention was peaceful. It was in response to a budget crisis that was preventing
public servants (such as members of the military) from being paid . During military control, a
labor code and income tax bill were passed, and a sense of order restored. More importantly, the
1924 military action spurred the drafting of a new constitution in 1925. 94
The 1925 Constitution established a populist form of state and adopted the Import
Substitution Industrialization (lSI) model of economic development. The period 1925-1964 was
characterized by the emergence of an urban middle class along with policies of protected
industrialization, expansion of public education, distributive policies that favored the working
Silvia Borzutzky , Vital Connecti ons: Politics, Social Security and Inequality in Chile (Notre Dame , IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2002) , 2-3.
94 Ibid, 13,16.
93
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and middle class and significant state involvement in the economy. However, these policies had
a dark side. Silvia Borzutzky notes that " few economies in the world were studied as much as the
Chilean economy" during this time due to "its poor performance and often contradictory
problems . ..such as inflation, low rate of economic growth, low rate of capital accumulation,
dependency on copper, dependency on foreign capital and unequal distribution of income.t''"
Inflation was perhaps the most debilitating problem, but no anti-inflationary measures were
taken during this time . There are many explanations as to why both inflation and poor economic
performance in general characterized this period, but here the important point is that despite
policies in favor of the working and middle class, economic inequalities were actually
augmented during this period instead of reduced."
By the early 1960s, Chile was again facing a crisis due to exhaustion of the political and
economic model. In 1964, Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic Party was elected
and essentially dismantled the populist state in favor of an Estado Comunitario (Communitarian
State). Frei and the Christian Democrats sought to narrow socioeconomic differences by
integrating the rural peasantry and urban poor into the political system, revise the import
substitution model to reflect the current economic situation and expand the social function of the
state. As noted in the Chapter One , part of Frei 's social pol icy included the expansion of public
education with the construction of many new schools throughout the country. Frei' s vision of
transforming Chile both politically and socially by incorporating marginalized sectors of the
economy eventually failed, inequality worsened as the OINI coefficient rose from .48 (1957
1963) to .51 (1964-1969).97 Borzutzky argues that this was due to the fact that the left perceived

Borzutzky, 31.
See Borzutzky, Chapter 2 for various theories regarding poor economic performance during this period.
97 Bruce R. Scott and Jessica Leight, Chile: The Conundrum of Inequality, Harvard Business School Case Studies
(Boston, MA : Harvard Bus iness School Publ ishing, 2007), 23 .
95

96

47

Frei's policies as too moderate, and therefore did not support them, while the right saw them as
too revolutionary, and refused to lend him the resources to carry them out. 98 This three-way split
was clear in the 1970 election, as the right, center and leftist candidates each received
approximately one third of the vote . Socialist Salvador Allende won the election with a plurality
of 36.2%, with the right and center parties receiving 34.9% and 27.8%, respectively.
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Allende's administration tightened the state 's grip on the economy, nationalized the
already state-owned copper companies and the banking sector, instituted price controls and
established high tariffs and other protectionist measures. To address inequality, Allende carried
out extensive rural land reform. He also increased wages and expanded government social
programs. The results were positive, but fleeting. At first, the policies produced jumps in growth
rates, a decline in unemployment and lower inflation. However, soon the country experienced
extremely high inflation, fiscal and trade deficits, and shortages on goods that created long lines
at markets and provoked upper and middle class housewives to protest in the streets by banging
their empty pots and pans. Gains in terms of wages for the working class were driven down to
only 75% of their 1970 level after having originally risen 39 % in real terms. The inflation
especially negated any attempts at increasing the poorest quintile 's share of national income.
Although the GINI coefficient did fall from nearly .5 to around .475 , Allende's program did not
change the pattern of inequality that had, and continues to, plague Chilean society.l'"
September II, 1973 brought to a bitter end Allende's socialist experiment when the
military violently took over the government. As discussed in detail in Chapter One, after the
coup General Augusto Pinochet liberalized and privatized the economy under the tutelage of the
Chicago Boys, dramatically transforming it by undoing decades of state control and ownership.
Borzutzky, 96.
Ibid.
100 Scott and Leight, 3

98
99
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Although after the 1982 financial crisis economic planning strayed from the neoliberal model,
Chile kept a free-market oriented economy during the economic readjustment period.
Throughout the dictatorship, social spending was never a priority, but cuts were especially severe
after the 1982 crisis as part of the conditionality for receiving an IMF loan.
During the entire authoritarian period, income inequality went from bad to worse. From
the period 1974 to 1990, the GIN I coefficient rose from .53 to a historic high of almost .6. This
can be attributed to two main factors: the original harsh structural adjustment carried out in the
early years of the dictatorship and the protracted process of adjustment after the devastating 1982
crisis that disproportionately affected the lower quintiles. During the first part of the dictatorship,
the real wage dropped more than 30% in the two years following the coup, due to the elimination
of price controls. At the same time, strikes and collective bargaining were outlawed and
prominent labor leaders were killed or exiled. Wages would not recover the 1970 levels until
1992. In rural sectors, Allende's land reform was reversed and land became concentrated in the
hands of medium-sized export-oriented farms, forcing out smaller landholders from the
agricultural market. After 1982, the government was willing to intervene to provide subsidies for
failing banks and financial groups so that they could payoff their foreign debt, but did next to
nothing for the struggling poor, cutting spending on social services by 20% per capita. By the
end of the decade, despite recovered economic growth after the crisis, unemployment rates had
reached 24%, with over half belonging to the poorest quintile, and 38.6% of households fell
below the poverty line, compared to 17% in 1970.
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As shown, Chile has demonstrated few improvements
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terms of socioeconomic

inequality throughout its history. However, up until 1990, this inequality had almost always been
accompanied by either poor economic performance or in the case of the dictatorship, the harsh
101

Ibid, 8-9.
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effects of neoliberal structural adjustment that blatantly favored the upper classes over the
suffering poor, without the aid of social programs to alleviate some of the harsh consequences of
the its economic policies. The democratic governments after the transition inherited a social
crisis that required immediate attention.
Inequality is not perfectly correlated with poverty rates . In 1990, 38 .6% of Chile's
population was classified as poor and 12.9% were indigent. By 2003, these figures had fallen to
18.8% and 4.7%, respectively, demonstrating a notable reduction in poverty by the democratic
governance of the Concertaci6n. Usually this reduction in poverty is contributed to the high
growth rates during this period. Growth reached an annual average of 7.7% until the 1997 East
Asian crisis and subsequent devaluation in Brazil in 1999, during which growth fell to 2.5 %,
eventually recovering to 5.2% by 2005. 102 Kurt Weyland and Mauricio Olavarria-Gambi both
criticize the notion that poverty reduction is solely due to GDP growth, noting that an increase in
social spending to improve human capital has also contributed to the decrease in poverty levels,
due to the importance of an educated and healthy labor force. Olavarria-Gambi argues that in the
Chilean case, poverty was reduced due to both fast economic growth and comparatively high
human capital accumulation as a result of social spending.l'"
As noted in the previous chapter, social spending, including education spending,
increased throughout the 1990s. Despite this accomplishment, there were no significant
improvements in inequality throughout this period. In 1990 the GINI coefficient was .58, and it
is currently .57. Chilean economist Dante Contreras argues that since a reduction in poverty
occurred simultaneously with no improvements in inequality, this has left "everyone better off,"
10 2 World Bank, Chile: Ne w Economy Stu dy, Vol. I: Exe cut ive Summary and Policy Recommendations, Report No.
25666-CL, I 8 February 2004 ; Scott and Leigh t, 25.
103 Mauricio Olavarria-Gambi, "Poverty Redu ct ion in Chil e : has economic growth been enough?" Journal of Human
Development. Vo14, No .1 (2003 ): 105; Kurt Weyland, '''Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?" Latin
American Resear ch Review. Vol. 32, No. I ( 1997): 48 .
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meaning that both rich and poor have improved their socio-economic status. 104 Nevertheless, the
poor in Chile continue to live in very precarious conditions-r-over 20% of the population lives on
less than $320 a month.
Marcus Taylor adds several factors to the causes of perpetual inequality in Chilean
society. First of all, despite tax reform in the early 1990s, the tax structure still remains highly
regressive, with the top 10% of income earners paying 11.8% of their income in taxes , while the
poorest 10% pay 14.4%. He also argues that despite increases in social spending, these funds
have not been actively redistributed to the lower quintiles. Although the bottom three quintiles
do use proportionately more public spending, this is due to the dual public-private nature of the
major social institutions, including education, health care, and social security. This in turn has
created a system of differential access to these institutions. Those who can afford it use the
superior private services, while the poor are financially forced into the public sector. This only
serves to further deepen inequalities, a theme that will be touched upon in the context of
education in the next section. lOS
Taylor also notes that instead of coming from tax revenue, social spending is mainly
dependent on copper revenue from state-owned CODELCO (Corporacion Nacional de Cobre,

Chile) that is highly dependent on the maintenance of a labor system that keeps wages down and
job security low. This strategy is vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy, which
may seriously threaten funds for social spending in the future. It is also contradictory because the
funds for soci al spending that in theory should go towards the lessening of socioeconomic

104 Dante Contreras, "Poverty and Inequality in a Rapid Growth Economy : Chile 1990-96," The Journal of
Development Studies, Vol. 39, No.3 (February 2003) : 182 ,
105 Marcus Taylor, From Pinochet to the Third Way': Neoliberalism and Soc ial Transformation in Chile, London:

Pluto Press, 2006, 177.
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inequalities in fact come from a sector of the economy that, according to Taylor, perpetuates

inequality.l'"
Throughout its history, wide gaps consistently existed between the rich and the poor in
Chile. Despite high growth rates, macro-economic stability, increased spending on social
institutions and vast reductions in poverty and indigence levels, inequality continued to exist
throughout the 1990s up to present day. Although Taylor provides some explanations as to why
vast income disparities still plague Chilean society , one more factor will be discussed in the next
section, providing an explanation as to why inequality was such a prominent theme during the
2006 high school protests.

3.2 Links between socioeconomic inequality and education
Harald Beyer, Chilean economist, argues that the direct source of inequality in Chile is
differences in wage earnings among workers. Unlike the past, inequality is not solely based on a
small oligarchy controlling the majority of the capital of the country. It is instead found in the
sharp differences in wages earned between the top 10% of the population and the bottom 90 % .
Beyer shows how inequality in Chile is the product of the elevated participation of the top decile
in the national revenue. This can be illustrated by tweaking the GINI coefficient data. In 1998
Chile's GINI coefficient was approximately .57 . However, by excluding the richest 10% Chile 's
recalculated GINI coefficient would be around .28, in line with some of the most egalitarian
countries in the world such as Gerrnany.l'" To compare, if this same exercise was done to the
GINI coefficient of the United States, it would only drop from .38 to .34 . These calculations also
show that in Chile, the top 10% of the population is very heterogeneous in terms of its income
earnings, a factor that is often overlooked. People tend to assume that the rich are homogenously
Tay lor, 196
Harald Bey er , "Educaci6n y desiguald ad de ingreso s: una nueva mirada," Estudios Publicos 77 (verano 2000),
J0 I.

106
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wealthy, when in reality the top 2% of the population controls much more wealth (almost 40% of
the assets of Quintile V representing 20% of the entire population's wealth).108 While inequality
is usually thought of as the differences between the rich and the poor, or between the upper and
lower classes, in Chile's case, much inequality lies in the difference between the extremely rich
and the middle class, or using the anal ysis in the previous section, the disparity between those
that belong to GSE ABCI and those belonging to GSE C2 that fit into the same income quintile.
How is it then that 10% of the population is able to control the majority of national
income if its wealth is not necessarily based on owning capital? The answer, in Chile's case, is
directly linked to education. This is because in Chile, a university education gives extremely high
returns compared to the low returns of primary school and high school education. This is to say
that adding an additional year of primary or secondary education has very marginal effects on
work earnings, whereas an additional year of higher education significantly increases potential
earnings. Figure 3.1 illustrates this. The returns start to rise around 12-14 years of education, and
significantly increase after 16-17 years of education, representing the completion of four to five
years of post-secondary education. Table 3.4 illustrates the average years per income quintile,
showing an obvious pattern of more years of schooling in the higher quintiles. Beyer argues that
this proves that "the marked difference in earnings of people according to their level of
education, especially between those that have higher education and those that do not have it
translates into economic segmentation that clearly is defined by education."lo9
Of course, it is logical to assume that someone with higher education will earn more than
someone with less education. In Chile this relationship is augmented. Beyer illustrates this by
calculating the ratio between salaried workers who have finished primary school and salaried

108
109

See Beyer, Cuadra No.2, 102.
Beyer, 110.
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Figure 3.1. Work Earnings (in CHP) of Men by years of schooling
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I
7.3
8.6
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9.7
III
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11.3
14.1
V
Average
10.1
Harald Beyer, "Educacion y desigualdad de mgresos : una nueva mirada," 110.

workers who have a degree in higher education. On average, a Chilean male who works full time
with a university degree earns 5.26 times more than a Chilean male full-time worker who has
only finished primary school. To compare, in the United States, this ratio is only 2.54. Beyer
calls this phenomenon "the great prize" of a university education. Chilean economist Alejandra
Mizala, member of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Education, confirmed Beyer's
analysis, contending that, "salaries are so linked to the education that you receive, to the studies
that you undertake ... therefore the difference between the rate of return of people who have
higher education in Chile versus people that only have secondary education is enormous. v'!' She

110 Graph based on CASEN results from 1994, measured men who work in Santiago, work full time (40 hours or
more per week) and are between 25 and 54 years old. Results for women were similar.
"I Alejandra Mizala (Associate Professor of Econom ics, Facu Ity of Industrial Engineering, University of Chile and
member of Presidential Advisory Committee on Education) in discussion with author, January 2008, Santiago ,
Chile.
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argues that the current education system is impeding social mobility, simply due to the fact that
not enough students have access to higher education. Mizala classifies higher education not only
as university studies, but also as high quality technical education . She believes that education can
be a vehicle for social mobility and a way to decrease societal inequalities. She argues that if
"you move a lot of people into higher education . ..you will in general have better salaries, and
therefore will generate a process of more equal yields and better social mobility.,,112
From Beyer's and Mizala's analysis, one can conclude that higher education, whether it
is university or technical school, is integral to be able to earn a decent salary. To be able to study
in a university in Chile, it is imperative that students receive high quality primary and secondary
education, something currently only available to a small percentage of students As of 2003,
37.6% of all students continued on to some form of higher education, while only 14.6% of
students from the lowest income quintile received higher education, compared to 73 .6% in the
highest quintile. 113 Leaders in the student movement recognize and understand this unequal
access to higher education. Sebastian Vielmas and Maria Jose Sanhueza both described the
system as one that prepares the vast majority of students to be laborers, while only a small
percentage receives a high quality university education and are thereby groomed to be bosses.
The essence of these students' analysis is true . The system is set up so that only a privileged
minority has access to higher education. 114
Rather than lessening inequalities, the current education system reproduces them in
Chilean society, due to the unequal access to higher education. This limited access has roots in

Ibid.
113 MIDEPLAN , Division Social, Encuesta CASEN 2003, 25 Nov 2007
http ://www .mid epJan.cl/c asen/cuestionari os .html.
114 Maria Jesus Sanhueza (Former Spokesperson, ACES) and Sebastian Vielmas (Former President, Student Center,
Liceo de Aplicacion) in discussion with the author, January 2008, Santiago , Chile.
112
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both the primary and secondary education system as well as the system of higher education in
Chile, themes that will be anal yzed below.

3.3 Inequality in the Education System: Why more students can't go to college
Inequality in the education system is a reflection of the socioeconomic inequality in the
Chilean population. Additionally , the system serves to maintain and perpetuate disparities by not
imparting a high quality education to all students and failing to create the opportunity for all via
higher education. The vicious cycle of inequality is not only the fault of the primary and
secondary education systems, but is also due to the way in which higher education is organized
in Chile, as well as the process and cost of admittance. Both of these themes will be analyzed in
this section to construct a better understanding of the phenomenon of socioeconomic inequality
in Chile .
Cristian Cox defines equality as having three spheres when it comes to education: equity
in opportunity of access and permanency, equity in educational processes and equity in results,
summarized in Table 3.5 . 115 In terms of the first category, there is no doubt that the reforms of
the 90s improved access to education for lower socio-economic levels. Mizala noted that
"educational coverage ceased to be a problem a long time ago. ,,116 In terms of access to highschool education, the difference between the lowest and highest income quintiles decreased from
20 percentage points (74% vs. 94%) in 1990 to 16 percentage points (83% vs. 99%) in 2000.
Access to primary education also increased for those from the lowest quintiles, from 94% in

115 Cr istian Cox, "Las politicas educacionales de Chile en las ultimas dos decadas del siglo XX," in Cr istian Cox,
Ed. Polfticas educacionales en el cambio de siglo: La reforma del sistema escolar de Chile (Santiago: Editorial
Universitaria, 2005), 95.
1' 6 Mizala in discussion with author, January 2008.
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1990 to almost 98% in 2000. Change among the highest quintile was less than 1% (98 % to
99%).117

T able 3 5 S ummary 0 fThree Siplheres 0 fI nequa tty
2"U Sphere

1~'

Sphere
Equity in Opportunity of
Access and Permanency
Reforms of the 1990s
improved access to primary
and secondary education
among lower quintiles

Equity in Educational Processes
The shared funding law of 1993
exacerbated the division of
schools along socioeconomic
lines (educational aparthe id)

3 ra Sphere
Equity in Learning Results
After initial success of Improvement
Programs in early 1990s, there was no
sustained improvement in test scores
between socioeconomic qroups

It is in the second and third spheres of educational equality where the current problems
lie. The second sphere of equality, relating to educational processes, has deteriorated over the
course of the 1990s. Schools have become even more divided along socio-economic lines. This
is a consequence of the 1993 shared funding law that made the majority of subsidized private
schools out of financial reach for man y poor families as discussed in Chapter One. As shown in
Table 3.6, students from the lowest income deciles are concentrated in public municipal schools
while those from the highest income deciles are concentrated in unsubsidized private schools. In
other words, students attend schools with peers from the same socio-economic level. This has
important implications in terms of educational outputs; results from the PISA test , an
international standardized te st administered by OECD (Chile started to participate in 2006) show
that the educational systems with the best results are those that have classrooms with students
from mixed socio-economic backgrounds. This type of classroom make-up is a rare occurrence
in Chile, where schools are largely divided among socio-economic lines.

11 8

Not only are lower

income students receiving sub-par education, but socioeconomic segregation decreases the
quality of education as a whole.
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Cox, 95; Cristian Beller, "(,Ha tenido impacto la reforma educativa chilena?" in Cox, Ed 131 .
Cox, 104.
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Table 3.6 . Enrollment in School Type by Income Quintile, 2000.
Income Quintile

Municipal

Subsidized Private

Unsubsidized Private

1 (low)

46.5%

21 .3%

2.6%

2

32 .8%

23 .9%

3.3%

3

21 .1%

25.1%

7.7%

4

11 .6%

19.5%

17%

5 (high)

4.3%

10.1%

694%

Alejandra Mizala, based on CASEN 2000, obtained from discussion With author.

In terms of equity in learning results, SIMCE results demonstrate that the 15% of poorest
students who benefited from the P-900 programs described in Chapter One have improved their
performance in terms of other more privileged students. However, as Beller observes, these
improvements were more profound during the first part of the 1990s, and then leveled off,
demonstrating the failure of the reforms to consistently improve results. When SIMCE results
from the entire student population are analyzed, comparing 1998 to 2003, the differences in
scoring between socioeconomic levels remain statistically constant. 119 As shown in Table 3.7,
the disparity between the SIMCE scores between the richest and poorest students is more than
seventy points. These data come from the 1999 SIMCE for fourth grade students, but data from
2006 for fourth grade students show almost no variation, neither in the test scores themselves nor
the disparity between socioeconomic groups. Despite Cox's optimism regarding an initial
decrease in inequality of results, much needs to be done to improve this poor performance and
the large disparity.

119 Ann Matear, " Equity in education in Chile : The tensions between policy and practice," International Journal of
Educational Development, Vol. 27, Issue I (January 2007): 110 Table 4
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Table 3 ..
7 SIMCE Scores bor 1999 F ourt h G ra ders b)y Inco me

o eCI'1e

Students' Socio-economic Decile
1 (L)

2

Math Scores

223 .7

Language Scores

222 .9

4

229.4

3
232.7

237.7

242.6

250 .1

228.7

232.5

236.8

242 .1

250 .2

5

6

7

8

9

10 (H)

256.4

265.1

275 .8

295 .2

257.9

266.3

277 .5

295 .2

Mizala, calculations based on SIMCE 1999, o bta ined from discussion with author.

The system of higher education in Chile also contributes to socioeconomic inequalities,
perpetuating disparities initially formed at the primary and secondary levels. Ann Matear notes
that " university study can no longer be viewed as a luxury for developing countries, and . . .
improving the quality of educational provision at primary and secondary levels is an essential
pre-condition for promoting more equitable access to higher education. v' <'' Given this, the
characteristics of the higher education system add yet another part to the vicious cycle of
educational and socioeconomic inequality in Chile. The main problem lies in unequal access to
the system by students from lower income families. The lack of adequate financi al aid and low
incentives for universities to extend what aid exists to those in need closes the door to many
students.
The roots of the modern higher education system extend from 198 I, when along with his
complete structural reorganization of the primary and secondary education system, General
Augusto Pinochet also drastically changed the system of higher education by enacting the
General Law of Universities that privatized and reduced state funding for previously public
universities. From 1981 to 1990, funding for higher education was cut by 40%. Prior to this law,
public higher education was free, but access was limited due to spaces available (there were only
eight universities) and thus restricted to a small, elite and homogenous group of students. The
1981 law encouraged entrepreneurs to open small private institutions of higher education,
spurring the founding of many private universities, and

re-organized the "traditional

120 Ann Matear, "Barriers to Eq uitable Access: Higher Education Policy and Practice in Chile Since 1990," High er
Edu cation Policy Vol. 19, Issu e I (2006): 34.
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universities," creating twenty-five state-funded institutions belonging to the Council of
University Rectors. The law also encouraged the opening of private Professional Institutes and
Technical Training Centers. In addition to the traditional universities, there currently exist forty
private universities, sixty-five Professional Institutes and 120 Technical Training Centcrs.i'"
Oscar Espinoza explains that the expansion of private higher education in Chile has
produced a double injustice for poorer students. In Chile traditional universities have a better
reputation and more rigorous academic standards, whereas private institutions are considered low
quality-usually the only requisite for admission is the ability to pay.122 The most privileged
high school graduates, usually from unsubsidized private schools, move on to the higher quality
"traditional" universities that in general have lower tuition and more access to scholarships and
loans. In contrast, less privileged students receive a lower quality secondary education,
preventing their admission into more prestigious universities and leaves them with the often
impossible option to pay for private institutions of inferior quality .123 As Matear notes, the
quality of university education affects future earnings and perpetuates the cycle of inequality.
Throughout the 1980s, enrollment in higher education doubled as an effect of the opening
of private universities, but increases occurred mainly within the upper-middle and upper classes.
As of 1998, students from the top two income quintiles made up over 60% of university
enrollment, and students from the lowest quintile only composed 7%.124 Despite the fact that by
1990 the state only funded 27% of the cost of higher education and all schools charged tuition
payments, higher education reforms throughout the decade and into the twenty-first century
\
sought to make student loans and scholarships more accessible. However, universities
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themselves are in charge of distributing, managing and recollecting student loans, causing a
disincentive to provide loans to lower income students who have a higher risk of default.
Another source of state funding rewards schools that recruit students who scored wei I on the
PSU (the university admissions test) . This creates fierce competition for students, and in turn
causes universities to redistribute this funding through grants or fee reductions to these students.
This promotes inequality, for as shown above, students who do well in school are more likely to
be from richer families. In fact , out of those who scored above 600 on the PSU, 47% were from
private schools, even though they only represented 19% of those who took the test. 125
University admissions policies also

further inequalities. Until 2004, universities

belonging to the Council of University Rectors had some flexibility when it came to their
admissions practices and could favor students from lower income levels by giving weighted
advantages to high performing students from poor backgrounds. Though practiced by very few
universities, in 2004 this ability was relinquished in favor of a process solely based on a
weighted average of high school grades (10-30% depending on the university) and the PSU (70
90%).126 This disfavors students from low socioeconomic backgrounds who receive lower
quality education and therefore inevitably have lower grades and lower scores on the PSU than
their peers in the upper income quintiles. If students from the upper quintiles, despite receiving a
better education, still do not perform well enough to gain admission to a traditional university,
they will likely still be able to attend a private university because they can pay, increasing their
prospects for earnings over lower income students who cannot afford to pay tuition to a private
.
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Access to higher education in Chile is integral for social mobility due to the high returns
of a college education. Unequal access to this "prize" has its roots in primary and secondary
education, where students both attend schools and perform based on their socioeconomic level.
Due to higher education funding and university admissions policies, disparities are deepened
because lower income students are not able to gain admission to the higher quality and more
prestigious traditional universities, and are left to attend lower quality private universities, if they
are able to go at all. Despite the fact that current Chilean educational policy states that higher
education should be accessible to all those that could benefit academically, and that admission
should be based only on academic performance, the existence of a large private sector and tuition
payments inevitably introduce financial considerations as well. 128 Additionally, even if
admissions procedures were solely based on academics, the majority of lower income students
would still be negatively discriminated against, due to lower on average academic performance.

3.4 Conclusion: The emergence of a new discourse on inequality
Prior to the presidential elections of 2005, inequality was not part of political or societal
discourse; throughout the 1990s inequality was a taboo subject. To talk about socioeconomic
disparities was equivalent to criticizing Chile's economic successes in terms of growth and
poverty reduction . Despite a lack of "official discourse" regarding socioeconomic inequality, a
public opinion study conducted in 1994 revealed that the majority of Chileans believed that
inequality was a "structural" phenomenon due to the fact that economic development had only
benefited a small minority. The idea that inequality was caused by an individual's unwillingness
to find work was widely rejected, although discourses on the subject reflected that Chileans
believed that the situation inherited by individuals or groups determined ones destiny . This
rejects the idea of social mobility and reflects fatality when it came to prospects for improving
128
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Chilean socioeconomic inequality . Chileans in this survey also fully recognized that they were
living in a classist and materialistic society.!" In this authors' recent experience, these attitudes
are confirmed, but there exists little willingness to change the situation-inequality is seen as an
obstacle to Chilean economic development, yet it is also seen as something endemic and
systemic. Chileans tend to blame the State, the Parliament and large corporations for inequality
therefore placing it in a context in which individuals have little power to instill change.
However, in 2005 , the official political discourse on inequality began to change, and for
the first time, presidential candidates from both sides began to address the issue of inequality in
their campaigns. Upon election, President Bachelet admitted that " inequality is the principal
obstacle that we confront to make Chile a developed country" and promised to aggressively
address the issue during her tenure as president. 130 Around the same time, the elite class began to
worry that social tensions caused by inequality would explode into crisis and admitted their role
in blocking reforms that would create a more equal society . It is debatable whether the Right
used this same discourse purely to gain votes, but the important point is that for the first time, the
government, the Right wing opposition and the elite economic class acknowledged that the
economic system has a role to play in correcting inequality that may impede economic growth
and threaten political stability.!"
The issue of inequality became a central theme during the student movement. In a break
from the past, students were motivated to change a problem that was seen as endemic by the
general population. Some popular slogans used on student blogs and scrawled on buildings
included: "Our motivation to keep struggling: future, equality, effort and union! "; "Michelle, you
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left us to the luck of the market"; "Dignified and equal education for all!" One slogan,
purposefully misspelled, read "Dizculpem, soi municipal." Its underlying message translates to
mean "excuse my lack of education, I'm educated at a municipal school ," showing how students
perceived the low quality education given by municipal schools. 132 Their demands also reflected
the preoccupation with equality. Students wanted the PSU to be free to equalize access to this
essential step in the admissions process. The students believed that an end to municipalization
and subsequent centralization of public school administration would improve equality.
Additionally, conversations with students revealed that they identified one of the major
faults with the current education system as its inherent inequality. They described it as a " system
of classes" in which a small group of elite receive a higher quality education and the vast
majority who attend state funded schools do not. 133 Members of the teachers' union also said that
due to its organization, the system separates the rich from the poor. Luis Vicencio, teacher and
union leader, explained that the Colegio de Profesores (Teachers' Union) had tried to call
attention to the debilitating inequality in the education system years ago (an official report by the

Colegio was published in 1997) but it was not until the student protest that the government
showed interest in trying to resolve the issue. One student suggested that the reason the protests
emerged when they did was due to the election of Michelle Bachelet- students' perceived that
due to her campaign promises and leadership style she would be more sensitive to their demands
than former president Ricardo Lagos.l " Indeed, at the time of her election, Bachelet seemed to
represent a change from the traditional party politics of the past, though her current low approval
ratings demonstrated that most of the population no longer believes this,
132 Taken from the Instituto Nacional's fotolog, www .fotolog .com/institutanos and slogans written on Liceo de
Aplicaci6n in Santiago, Chile.
13 Sanhueza, Vielmas, Nicolas Vicente (Former student leader, Liceo Agusto D'Halmar de Nufioa) and Tatiana
Castillo (Current High School Student) in discussions with the author, Santiago, Chile, January 2008,
134 Alvaro Fuenzalida (former student and current fotolog administrator, lnstituto Nacional)in discussion with the
author, January 2008 , Santiago, Chile.
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Students were likely to be aware of the changing political discourse regarding inequality
during the 2005 presidential campaign, and

therefore sought to challenge Bachelet's

administration to act on campaign promises to improve socio-economic inequality . In fact, many
slogans during the protests addressed the president directly, including " Deliver, Michelle! "; " We
don't want more band aids, Bachelet" and outside of her Alma Matter, Liceo No . I Para Nifias
Javiera Carrera, one read: "Don't forget that you too were a Javierina, Bachelet. Are you with
me?,,135 Both students and teachers have been aware of educational inequality and its links to
socioeconomic disparities for years, but the year 2006 presented itself as a good opportunity to
mobilize due to the changing political discourse and new leadership who the pinguinos could
challenge to deliver her campaign promises.
This chapter has explained the links between educational and socioeconomic inequality
and demonstrated that this issue was central to student demands during the Revolucion Pinguina.

It also provided an explanation as to why the protests emerged in 2006 and not before, due to
Bachelet's election and the changing political discourse concerning inequality. The next chapter
will analyze the method-popular protest--empLoyed by the students to enact political change
due to the perceived futility of other types of political participation resulting from a changing
political atmosphere following the democratic transition.
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Chapter Four
Popular Protest and Political Attitudes
"I believe that the protests were necessary," asserted Vania Gonzalez, twelfth grade
student at Licea No. I Para Nifias, an emblematic high school in Santiago, "they were necessary
because we as Chilean citizens were in a certain way exercising the power that belongs to us. We
passed through dictatorship and entered into democracy ... but the social base in general feels
exploited and in disagreement with the government, but it doesn't manifest it. ..we have a society
that is asleep.,,136 Maria Jesus Sanhueza echoed Gonzalez's sentiment about the effects of the
dictatorship on Chilean society:
The daily life of the people here in Chile is low quality. Despite the precarious
conditions in which they live, people are unable form a level of solidarity with
their neighbor that is probably living in the same conditions. And this is not
because people are so-called "bad," it's because there was a dictatorship and
when there were more than two people meeting they arrived and they assassinated
them. And this generated a huge level of terror ... This generated an environment
of fear, and a rejection of organization, even a rejection of conversation that today
makes daily life unconnected. IJ7
The participants in the Revolucion Pinguina represent the first generation of students to not grow
up under dictatorship. Chilean youth are stereotyped as being ambivalent towards politics, but
this new generation staged one of the largest student protests of the last thirty years in Chile.
They put tremendous pressure on the current political system, demanding true reform instead of
just another compromise.
In general, this chapter will focus on the political aspects of the 2006 mobilizations. First
it will first explore popular protest in Chile under the dictatorship, analyze how the National
Days of Protest contributed to political change, and draw parallels between these protests and the

136 Vania Gonzalez (Current Student, Liceo No . I Para Nifia s) in discuss ion with the author, January 2008 , Santiago,
Chile.
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Revolucion Pinguina. Secondly I will briefly describe the democratic transition and show the
ways in which polic y decisions and law making have been constrained due to authoritarian
enclaves and the desire to maintain macroeconomic stability and growth. Third, I will evaluate
political apathy, especially among students, as it relates to the dynamics of the transition period.
Finally, I will analyze the political outcome of the Revolucion, and argue that although the
mobilizations seemed to have raised consciousness about educational topics among the Chilean
public, the response of the governing coalition seems to be yet another compromise, especially in
the eyes of student leaders. It will depend on whether there is another major protest in 2008 (as
student leaders and teachers have suggested) to pressure the government to take more action, or
if the division of the student movement due to politicization will prevent this from being
realized. Additionally, very recent (April 2008) developments in Chile have changed the political
landscape to one unfavorable for the student movement. The implication of these events will be
considered.

4.1 Popular protest under Pinochet and other historical influences
The surfacing of major opposition to the Pinochet regime emerged in 1982, in response to
the collapse of the "Chilean economic miracle" that had "provided the Pinochet government with
a certain amount of social support.,,138 The neoliberal restructuring of the economy by the
Chicago Boys produced significant growth, but was by no means immune to the financial and
economic crisis that hit Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s, and was especially hard on
the working class, with unemployment levels reaching 20% . The crisis even affected the middle
and professional classes, and therefore caused those who had originally supported the regime to
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begin to criticize government policies.':" This economic crisis provided the impetus for the
emergence of a vociferous political opposition and fourteen days of national protest that took
place between May of 1983 and August 1986. Mark Ensalaco argues that although this "crisis"
had economic causes, it was primarily political, providing an opportunity to challenge the regime
and call for democratization. 140
An important element of the emergence of the opposition during this period was protest
from the " popular sectors" of Chilean society. Philip Oxhorn acknowledges that "ambiguity and
lack of clarity" surround "the concept of popular in the social science literature.,.141 He defines
the notion of popul ar sectors as referring to "disadvantaged" groups in a society that is highly
segmented and unequal, like that of Chile. The popular sector is a heterogeneous group that
includes organized labor, workers that lack class organization in the formal economy, the
unemployed, workers in the informal economy, and the peasantry . Oxhorn also includes women
and youth in this category. I argue that the 2006 student protest represented a popular protest for
two reasons-the participants were young and the majority came from municipal schools whose
parents would most likely be part of the " popular sector."
After violently taking power in 1973, Pinochet outlawed all political parties. In the wake
of the 1982 economic crisis, the regime was unable to eradicate the cause of discontent through
traditional methods of repression, and therefore provided an opening for political opposition to
reemerge. Because political parties were still illegal, Pinochet's rivals initially formed "non
partisan" groups such as PRODEN (Project for National Development). When the dictatorship,
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distracted by the economic situation, did not crush groups like this , more opposition groups
began to resurface, such as the Alianza Democratica. 142
The wave of popular protest staged by the opposition under the Pinochet Regime began
on May 11, 1983, when the new president of the Copper Miner Workers Confederation, Rodolfo
Seguel, coordinated with newly emerged opposition groups for the first National Day of Protest.
They asked Chileans to leave jobs early, refrain from sending their children to school, abstain
from purchasing anything, and most importantly, bang pots and pans at 8:00 pm in the streets,
harking back to the protests by middle and upper class housewives against Allende. That night,
the protests started with the solitary sound of a wooden spoon against a pot and escalated. People
in the lower class neighborhoods erected fire barricades on the street. Police arrested 600 people
and killed two people by shooting indiscriminately into crowds of protestors. 143
Despite this state repression, another protest was planned for June. Segue I was arrested
during this manifestation, which in turn sparked another one in July. In August the bloodiest
protest yet was held; twenty-six were killed and the armed forces were called in to man posts
around the city. After the July protest, the opposition had formally united to form Alianza

Democratica (Democratic Alliance), composed of the Christian Democrats, moderate sectors of
the Socialist Party and the Radical Party. After the August protest, the Alianza met with Sergio
Jarpa, Pinochet's new Interior Minister to try to "defuse tensions that threatened to tear the
country apart. "!" However, talks were interrupted when members of armed opposition group
MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) attempted to assassinate General Carlos Usenza and heavy
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police brutality was used to break up the September protest, in spite of a previous agreement by
both the opposition and government to conduct a peaceful demonstration.
In October, the Communist Party decided to begin participating in the National Protests,
and together with the MIR and radical sectors of the Socialist Party formed the opposition group
MOP (Popular Democratic Movement). Despite the fact that Pinochet explicitly declared thi s
type of organization illegal, the MOP continued to function because its ultimate goal was the
violent overthrow of the Pinochet regime. The MOP and the Alianza differed in their means of
bringing about a change in administration, especially in their opinions about armed struggle. i"
This prevented the two groups from presenting a strongly unified opposition to the Pinochet
dictatorship. The state also upped its repressive tactics. Pinochet declared a State of Siege 1984,
authorizing the armed forces to conduct raids on areas of potential opposition, targeting mainly
the poor po blaci
aciones. 146
The period of national protest continued until 1986, characterized by periodic popular
manifestations calling for the restoration of democracy and attempts by the opposition to unite
against Pinochet. Though during the time it appeared that the dictatorship was losing some of its
control, due to both domestic demands and international pressure to end Human Rights abuses
from the United States and United Nations, Pinochet was able to maintain his hold on power for
three more years. Brian Loveman attributes the failure of the opposition to unite and bring about
political change to "the persistent lack of consensus and intense polarization which had preceded
the military coup in 1973, combined with the repression of the regime" as well as " the inability
of the opposition to resolve the differences (historical, personal, and ideological) which divide[d]
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them from one another.,,147 It was not until 1988 when the opposition successfully united. It
formed a coalition to back the " no" vote on the plebiscite that was to decide whether Pinochet
would stay in power for eight more years. The Coalition for the No did not use popular protest to
advance its agenda, probably due to the lack of success earlier in the decade. However, Spooner
argues that the period of National Protest was "undoubtedly a useful political exercise that would
serve the same politicians well in planning their strategy for the 1988 presidential plebiscite" and
"irrevocably changed Chile's political climate.,,148
Popular protest was utilized as a tool to express political discontent under Pinochet with
little immediate success, due to a fractured opposition and repression from an authoritarian
government. Student protesters in 2006 used similar tactics to demand changes to the education
system. Despite an extremely different political environment, certain parallels can be drawn
between the two movements. Oxhorn notes that because political parties were outlawed during
the dictatorship, political activity shifted outside formal politics where it was more difficult to

repress.l'" This can also be seen in the 2006 mobilizations, but for different reasons. The
leadership and impetus did not come from political parties, but rather from a group of students
from varying political backgrounds. Despite political diversity, the pinguinos in 2006 were
initially more united behind their cause than the opposition groups in the 1980s ; similar
problems, however eventually arose due to disagreements over tactics and alleged politicization
of the movement. Students of the movement attempted systemic reform in 2006 , while in 1980
the opposition attempted the transformation of the entire form of governance to democracy, an
extremely difficult task given the repressive tactics used by the autocratic regime as well as its
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support from the powerful business sector. Despite these vast differences, the methods used to
instigate political change were similar, and for this reason it is worth noting this period as one of
the historical antecedents to the 2006 mobilizations.
Another important historical predecessor to the Revoluci6n is student protest in Chile. In
general, university students have overwhelmingly dominated these mobilizations, demonstrating
discontent over university policy as well as political events in general. Loveman argues that
although during the dictatorship the university system was purged of faculty and student
opposition to the regime, "groups of intellectuals, students and professionals stubbornly and
courageously refused to submit to the military dictatorship, thereby offering technical, political
and moral critiques which undermined General Pinochet 's credibility.,,15o Throughout the
twentieth century, Loveman notes that student movements "have played a colorful and vital role
in Chilean politics," demanding university, social and political reform. In 1931, university
protesters contributed to the general strike that ousted General Carlos Ibanez. 151 Starting in
1992, a main topic of university student demonstrations was lack of funding for higher
education, especially financial aid and loans for lower income students.

152

In 1997 and 1999

there were large protests that eventually led to the democratization of the governing structures of
many universities. In 1999 , the context of the manifestations was framed around Pinochet's trial
in London and the international financial crisis; students argued that there was money for
Pinochet's defense but not for higher education.P'' University students also protested policies
outside of the education system. In 2004 a McDonald 's restaurant in Santiago was destroyed
during a mobilization demanding shorter prison sentences for political prisoners. University
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students also heavily protested President George W. Bush's visit to the capital city that same
year. According to Nicolas Vicente student leaders of the Revolucion were inspired to take over
their schools because this tactic had been successfully employed during university protests since
1992. 154
As noted in Chapter Two , the Revolucion was not a spontaneous protest that emerged out
of thin air in May 2006. Rather, these four weeks represented the loud , public stage, or
"effervescence" of a serious movement led serious student leaders dedicated to educational
reform, as Juan Carlos Herrera, one of the spokespeople of ACES, put it. 155 Not only were the
2006 mobilizations the results of prior organization by student leaders, but they were not the first
high school student protests in Chilean history. In 1957, high school students in the port city of
Valparaiso protested a rise in the price of public transport alongside workers and political party
members. Under the Allende administration in 1972, secondary students protested the proposed
National Unified School, a movement directed by the Minister of Education. High school
students also participated in the National Days of Protest in the 1980s, calling for the
democratization of their high schools in the framework of the larger protests demanding the
democratization of the entire political system. Though secondary students participated in all of
the above protests, it would not be until 2001 when they would really take the reins and be the
protagonists call ing for reform.!"
Oscar Aguilera, et al. characterize the decade following the transition as one in which the
student movement disintegrated and there was a complete lack of interest in political
participation. Nevertheless, in 200 I , the student movement had a reawakening and a protest
154 Nicolas V icente (Former student leader, Liceo Agusto D 'Halrnar de Nufioa) in discussion with the author,
January 2008 , Santiago, Ch ile.
155 Tama ra Gutierrez Port illo and Cri stina Caviedes Reye s, Revolucion Pinguino : La Primera Gran Movilizacion del
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emerged called the Mochilazo , whose name stems from the word for backpack (mochila) and the
suffix "azo" denoting a strong blow. Thousands of students protested in the street against the
high cost of the student transport pass . The government refused to negotiate with the students
unless they had a formal student organization; the ACES was therefore formed and it was
successfully able to bargain with the government to bring control of the student pass from private
companies back to the hands of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) and reduce the cost.
Aguilera, et al. judges the Mochilazo to be the most important antecedent to the 2006
mobilizations, given that it was the first time that high school students, purely on their own
initiative, took to the streets to demand change. 157
The Chilean media has tried to connect the student protesters to another group of
protesters: hooded delinquents (encapuchados) that traditionally protest every year on 29 March
and 11 September, important dates in the political memory of the dictatorship.l " The common
perception in Chile is that the majority of youth that biannually destroy property and ransack
businesses were not even alive to experience or remember the dictatorship. According to El
Mercurio. Chile 's largest and very conservative newspaper, they use these dates to demonstrate a
broadly defined discontent with the government, or are linked to narco-trafficking and take
advantage of the confusion to rob and kill. 159 El Mercurio and other mainstream media,
especially at the beginning of the 2006 protests, described student protesters in similar terms,
highlighting the movements' violent aspects, using headlines that focused on how many students
were arrested instead of the reasons they were mobilizing. The students were aware of the
misrepresentation of their movement, and as Alarcon Ferrari notes, they were able to create and
Ibid., 4 .
March is The Day of the Young Combatant and commemorates the assassination of two young brothers from
the poblaciones in 1985 by the military regime. II September remembers the day 1973 coup .
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appropriate means of alternative communication through the use of technologies such as text and
instant messaging and blogs to avoid reliance on mainstream media. They also changed tactics
and began taking over schools instead of protesting in the street so as to not be associated with
the encap uchados. 160
This section focused on three main historical antecedents to the 2006 protests: the Days
of National Protest during the 1980s, university student protests and high school student protest,
especially the Mochilazo. The next section will explain how the transition to democracy changed
the nature of politics in Chile, leading to disappointment with the ruling political coalitions
among the general population.
4.2 Authoritarian enclaves and the compromises of the Concertacion

Towards the end of June 2006, the student leadership of the movement broke apart.
Participants in the protests, as well as the media, attribute this break up to a number of factors ,
including the politicization of the movement, academic pressure and ideological differences.
However, at the initial stages of organization, the group of student leaders was characterized as
apolitical without affiliation to any party. In this section, I argue that one of the main reasons that
students organized in this way is because they do not identify with political parties. The current
political party system fails to represent its constituents and enact reform, stemming from the
transition period 's authoritarian enclaves and limitations imposed by the maintenance of the
neoliberal economic model that favors elite interests disconnected with the average Chilean's
reality . This section will evaluate how authoritarian enclaves and the system of political party
coalitions have made overturning policies enacted by the authoritarian regime a long and
difficult process, characterized by compromise and a strengthening of moderate positions within
160 Cristian Alarcon Ferrari, "The student movement in Chile during 2006 and beyond: reclaiming the right to
education in a worldwide symbol offree market, neo-liberalism and capitalist hegemony," Master's Thesis ,
University of Chile, 2006, 21.
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the Concertaci6n. In turn, this has caused a distancing of select political party members from
their social bases , opening up spaces for independent movement such as the Revoluci6n.
Rosalind Bresnahan provides a very succinct definition of the Concertaci6n, the political
coalition that has ruled Chile since the transition in 1990:
the Concertaci6n is the direct successor of the Coalition for the No , created to
unify the opposition to Pinochet for the 1988 plebiscite .. .[it is] an unprecedented
but tension-ridden political alliance of former adversaries drawn together by
political necessity as much as by ideological affinity ... today it consists of the four
major parties of the center-left. 161
The political necessity that drew together the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist
Party (PS) , the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Social Democrat Radical Party (PRSD) and
twelve other parties in the late 1980s was the plebiscite. According to the scheduled transition
laid out in the 1980 Constitution, this round of voting would determine whether Pinochet would
remain in power for eight more years or if democratic elections would be held . To Pinochet's
dismay, the formula for transition had the unintended affect of causing the opposition to set aside
its prominent differences that had prevented unity in the early 1980s to defeat Pinochet in
1988. 162
Despite the opposition 's success in the plebiscite, it quickly faced many restraints from a
variety of sources. First of all, the Coalition for the No did not win by a landslide; Pinochet
received 43% of the vote. This meant that more than anything, maintaining a united front was
crucial. To appeal to a wider variety of constituents, especially the all important business class
that had traditionally been staunch supporters of Pinochet due to his economic model, the newly
formed Concertaci6n moderated its positions and settled for very minimal reforms to the 1980
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Constitution. Most importantly, it maintained the neoliberal economic structure. This strategy
proved effective and its presidential candidate, Patricio Aylwin, won the 1990 election.
After 1990, the Concertacion was severely limited by the institutional structure acquired
from the authoritarian regime. These so-called authoritarian enclaves affected the electoral
system, social policies (including education, as discussed in Chapter One), the Armed Forces, the
state apparatus, the legislative branch and local politics. Notably, the Senate was dominated by
the Right, due both to the electoral laws and the presence of nine senators appointed by Pinochet
before leaving office. The binomial electoral system virtually guaranteed that one representative
from the Left and one from the Right would win each district. Many binding laws (leyes de

amarre) established by the authoritarian regime, such as the LOCE, could only be overthrown by
a two-thirds vote in Parliament. This meant that the Concertacion was forced to bargain and
compromise with the right wing parties (Renovaci6n Nacional, RN and Union Dernocratica
Independienta, UOI)163 to bring about any major structural changes. Thus, the new democratic
regime came to be known as the "democracy by agreements" (democracia de los acuerdos).

164

The overall strategy adopted by the Concertaci6n alienated it from its bases of support,
especially among the popular sectors. Though in some ways its strategy was dictated by the
authoritarian enclaves and desires to cater to business interests, the Concertaciori's goal was to
maintain macroeconomic stability and the neoliberal economic model because it came to believe
that this was the best option for Chile. Admittedly the Concertaci6n has tried to alleviate the
social cost of this type of policy through increased social spending throughout 1990s that along
with positive growth helped poverty dramatically decrease. However, the overall strategy has

163 These two parties have been part of coalitions under various names since 1989. Since 2000, they have been
united under the Alliance for Chile (Alianza por Chile).
164 Philip Oxhorn, "Understandin g Political Change after Authoritarian Rule: The Popular Sectors and Chile's New
Democratic Regime," Journal of Latin American Studies. Vol. 26, NO .3 (Oct., 1994): 744 .
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favored "accumulation over inclusion and distribution and the interests of business over those of
labor" and has failed to address socio-economic inequality. 165 This has left many disillusioned
with the Concertacion, chiefly those in the popular sectors who have continued to suffer
economically under the democratic regime. Especially at the beginning of the transition period,
many shantytown dwellers were disappointed with the slow pace of reform and lack of changes
in their day to day lives, and felt that the Concertaci6n was catering to business interests instead
of paying attention to their needs.l'" However, these people did not turn to right wing parties
because of their historic association with Pinochet. The General maintained power as head of the
armed forces until 1997, and then was sworn in as a senator for life until his indictment by a
Spanish court in 1999 for human rights abuses. It was not until the late 90s that the right wing
parties tried to distance themselves from Pinochet to try to appeal to a broader popular base. In
the 1999 elections, right-wing candidate Joaquin Lavin decided to cut ties with the General,
promising that the former dictator would be tried for human rights abuses if elected. 167
The transition marked a new style of party politics for both the Concertaci6n and rightWing parties, centering on large national electoral campaigns once every couple of years. In
between elections, parties mainly focus on elite decision-making, which Oxhorn argues opens up
political space for movements independent of political parties. This contrasts with the years prior
to the coup, in which political party leadership was often the force behind social organization.
Movements such as the Revoluci6n can be directly linked to compromises made by the
Concertaci6n and its inability to connect with the popular sectors such as students. A resident of
a poblaci6n summarized this view, saying "the role of politicians is different than it was before
1973. Then, they made the demands of the people their own. Now, they are very technical , very
16 5
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far from the demands of the people. ,,168 Luis Vicencio, member of the Chilean Teachers ' Union,
points out what he sees as the contradictory actions of a "leftist" coalition:
Today we [Chile] publicly appear to have a democratic government from the left
[but] ... the truth is that here is where it is clearest that neoliberalism is
working ... social contradictions are advancing to the point where we have an
economy that ensures that the large national companies and oligarchic groups
keep getting richer at the same time that there is a huge poverty problem.l '"
The divide between the population and political parties has caused disillusionment
towards the government and politics. As shown in Chapter Three and reflected by Vicencio 's
comment, the Concertaci6n's continued commitment to business interests and macroeconomic
growth has failed to address Chile 's persistent and serious socio-economic inequality. Politicians
have not connected with the general public, and this is clearly reflected by public opinion as well
as participation in elections. A series of polls conducted by the Center for Public Studies (Centro

de Estudios Publicos, CEP) from November 1994 to November 2007 show that the percentage of
people that do not sympathize with either the Concertaci6n or the right wing alliance has risen
from 19% in 1994 to a high of47% in 2007, with an average of around 35%. Support for both
the Concertaci6n and opposition coalitions have subsequently dropped over this period . 170
In Chile, once registered to vote, one is obligated by law to cast a ballot. Table 4.1 shows
that after 1989 , not only did the percentage of registered voters who actually voted decrease, but
the total percentage of those that did not vote (including those not registered) increased from
12.75% to 34.23%. As the voting population increased, the number of total voters stayed
relatively constant, meaning that new voter registration increased at a much slower rate ,
demonstrating decreased interest in political participation. In a public opinion poll conducted
Oxhorn, "Understanding ... ", 750.
Luis Vicencio (Pro fessor and memb er ofColegio de Profesores , AG) in discussion with the author, Santiago,
Chile, January 2008 .
170 Centro de Estudios Publicos, Various Estudios Nacionales de Opinion Publica 1994-2007,
http://www.cepchil e.cl/dms/lang Ileal 443 pag 1.html.
168
169
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after the parliamentary elections in December 200 I, of those who were not registered to vote ,
37% said that the reason they weren't registered is because they did not have an interest in
politics, and 61% said they would not register to vote for the next presidential election.l'" In
2003, only 20% of those polled had a lot or enough confidence in Congress as an institution, and
a mere 8% had a lot or enough confidence in political parties. 172

. EIections
T a bl e 41 C omparative p articipanon In
Year
No.
Total Votes % of
Registere
reg.
d Voters
voters
that
voted
1989 P
7,557,537 7,158,727
94.72
1989 L
7,557,537 7,158,727
94.72
1993 P
8,085,439 7,376,691
91.23
1993 L
8,085,439 7,385,016
91 .34
1997 L
8,069,624 7,046,351
87.32
1999 P I
8,084,476 7,271 ,572
89.94
1999 P II
8,084,476 7,326,753
90.63
2001 L
8,075,446 7,034,292
87 .11
2005 PI
8,220,897 7,207,278
87.67
2005 PII
8,220,897 7,162,345
87.12
2005 L
8,220,897 7,207,351
87.67
P=Presidential Elections L=Legislative Elections

Total voting
age pop.

%
did
not
vote

%
blank!
null
ballot

% did not
vote
+blank!n
ull

8,204,844
8,204,844
8,900,887
8,900,887
9,614,341
9,978,828
9,978,828
10,562,000
10,958,265
10,958,265
10,958,265

12.8
12.8
17.1
17.0
26.7
27.1
26.6
33.4
34.2
34.6
34.2

2.5
5.1
5.6
8.8
17.8
3.0
2.0
12.7
3.7
2.8
8.4

15.25
17.80
22.73
25.78
44.46
30.11
28.59
46 .06
37.91
37.46
42 .63

From: Horacio Max Larrain L., 'lEI efecto del tipo de sistema electoral en la particip aci6n elector al," Master in
PoIitica I Science, University of ChiIe, http://proDoleo.cl/b log/wp
cont en tiupload sI2006 !08 /Si stema ~ '0 20y %70p a rti ejpacj % C 3 %B 3n%20ele ctor al%20CHoracio%20M ax %20Larr ain) .p

df(28 March 2008) .

After the transition to democracy, the failure of political parties to connect with their
bases of support due to a different style of party politics has caused disillusion and apathy with
politics in general in Chile, reflected in voting patterns and public opinion polls. The emergence
of the Revoluci6n de los Pinguinos can be interpreted as filling a political void left by political
parties no longer having consistent contact with their bases, especially in the popular sectors. The

17 ICentro de Estudios Publicos, Estudio Nac ional de Opinion Publica No. 42, December 200 I-January 2002,
http://www.eepehile .cl/dms/lang I/doe 3015 .html.
172 Centro de Estudios Publicos, Estudio Nacional de Opinion Publi ca No. 45 June-July 2003
http://ww w.eepchile.cl/dms/langl /doe3 70 6.htl111.
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Concertacion, the ruling coalition since the transition, has been limited by authoritarian enclaves
and forced to be a democracy by agreements, sacrificing political positions of the member parties
in favor of maintaining macroeconomic stability and business sector support. The decline in
voter participation can be linked to fewer younger people being politically active, a topic that
will be addressed in the following section.

4.3 Student attitudes towards politics: "No estoy ni ahi?"
As shown, political participation, measured by voting patterns, decreased from 1989 to
2005 among the general population. During the same time period, Chilean youth were
characteri zed as being politically apathetic-instead of appreciating and participating in the
democracy that their parents worked so hard to rebuild, they cared more about material
possessions. This belief was reflected in the phrase "No estoy ni ahi, " which roughly translates to
"I 'm not here nor there" and denotes indifference and a lack of interest. Emerging into
democracy after a decade of turbulent political opposition that worked to overcome an
authoritarian regime, the political disinterest of Chilean youth was surprising and disheartening
to many in Chilean society. However, this trend was by no means confined to Chile alone. It was
observed in Latin America as well as world wide. Through the examination of international ,
regional and national opinion studies, this section will analyze the notion of political apathy
among students in Chile, and explain how the Revolucion Pinguina challenges what society
believed was generation of youth disconnected from and apathetic towards political change.
In 1994 the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
(lEA) decided to undertake a two phase study on civic knowledge and attitudes towards
democracy and government among youth. The first phase surveyed over 90,000 fourteen year
olds in 28 countries. The second phase included 50,000 students in upper secondary school from
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sixteen countries, ranging in age from sixteen to nineteen. Chile participated in both phases and
the results not only reveal trends in comparison with other countries, but also have been analyzed
by Alejandro Carrasco Rozas to identify a political culture among Chilean students. In this
section, only the survey attitudes toward democracy and politics will be analyzed focusing on the
upper age group. Chilean twelfth grade students scored lower than the international average on
all three sections of the Civic Knowledge part of the study.

173

The results of the lEA Civic Education survey can be useful in comparmg Chilean
students ' attitudes towards politics, democracy and government with those of other countries and
the international average. More importantly, they also reveal that political apathy is not as
simplistic as society may think. Despite the fact that Chilean students may not be interested in
formal politics and have little trust in government related institutions, this does not preclude
them from having ideas about how a "good" government should act , what being a "good" citizen
means, or even prevent them from wanting to participate. Chileans even scored slightly above
the international average when asked if they agreed with the statement "I am interested in
politics." However, the international average was only 49% and Chile's students showed 54%
interest, by no means showing an overwhelming attraction to the subject. 174
When asked questions about what they expected of their governments, Chilean students
scored above the international average on both the society-related and economic Government
Responsibilities Scale. On the society-related side, Chilean students are likely to endorse a
government that provides health care, education and care for the elderly, as well as protects the
environment, ensures political opportunities for women, guarantees order and promotes moral
173 Jo-Ann Amadeo et al, Civic Knowledge and Engagement: An lEA Study of Upper Secondary Students in Sixteen
Countries, Amsterdam: lEA, 2002, 9-10,57.
htt[.J :!/www .wam .umd.edu/-jtpurtaiUpperSecondary Iiles/Ci vics%20 Book let%20l A.pdf
174 Other countries that participated in the upper secondary study included : Cypru s, Czech Republic, Denmark ,
Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland (German
speaking areas); Amadeo et ai, 108.
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behavior. On the econornic side , Chilean students value a government that guarantees jobs,
controls prices, supports industry, provides for the unemployed and reduces income inequalities.
Similarly, questions relating to students ' perceptions of good citizenship revealed higher than
average tendencies towards valuing conventional as well as social-movement related citizenship
activities . 175
In regards to their personal future political participation, Chilean students showed a
below average likelihood to vote-79% compared to 85% international average-but compared
to other countries were more likely to politically participate in other conventional ways such as
joining a political party, writing a letter to the newspaper, or being a candidate. They also scored
higher than the average on social movement related political activities such as participating in a
peaceful protest or collecting signatures for a petition.!" These results contradict data collected
from the Fourth National Youth Survey, conducted by the National Institute for Youth (lNJUV)
in 2003. This survey had a much broader age range (15-29) and asked a wider variety of
questions, not limited to attitudes towards politics. Therefore, the two sets of results can not be
perfectly compared. Nevertheless, the INJUV results show that of the youth over the age of 18,
only 27% were registered to vote , and of the vast majority that were not registered, only 28%

were willing to register.l " Because the INJUV findings represent a larger sector of the youth
population in Chile, it probably more accurately represents youth attitudes towards voting. The
incongruence could also be explained by the age differences. Perhaps younger students are more
idealistic and express a willingness that is never realized when voting age is reached.

Amadeo, et aI., 80-81,85-86 .
Ibid., 116.
I77 INJUV, Resultados Preliminares Cuarta Encuesta Nacional de Juventud 2003 , Doeumento de Trabajo No.5,
Departamento de Estudios y Evaluacion, April 2005, 3.
www.m ideplan.cUtinallbajar.ph p?path= ..ladmin/docdes cargas/eentl'odoc& id=cen(red ee 93.pd f
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The one area where Chilean students scored significantly below the international average
on the TEA test was in trust for the government. They only trust the national government 40% of
the time , compared to the international average of 44%.178 Broken down into various institutions,
students had least trust in political parties-they report only trusting them 11 .6% of the time,
compared to the international average of 20%. Students had the most trust for the police, but still
below the international average. These results are fairly closely mirrored in the TNJUV survey.
However, the question was framed differently, asking the level of confidence youth had in
various institutions (including non-political entities such as the family, school and church)
instead of how often they trusted them. The greatest difference was in trust for the Congressthe TEA test showed 41.6% of the time students trusted it, while the TNJUV survey showed only

18.2% level of support. This placed the Congress near the bottom of the institutions youth
trusted, while it placed it almost at the top of the list of political institution that students trusted
in the lEA test. Despite this difference, the rest of the results lined up-political parties were at
the bottom of the list, and police near the top.

179

Students mistrust for political parties is further demonstrated in the TNJUV study . Only

12.3% of respondents agreed with the statement that "political parties represent me and my
interests," while 78.5% disagreed . Similarly, 73.7% of respondents did not identify with any of
the main political coalitions. The TNJUV study notes that although these results show a negative
attitude towards political parties and politicians (respondents only had 7.7% confidence in
politicians and 12.4% confidence in senators and deputies), this does not mean that they believe
that democracy is a bad thing. In fact, 75% of respondents agreed that democracy is useful for
young people, and 72.5% preferred democracy over any other system of governance.

178 Amadeo et aI., 92-93 .
179INJUV,4 .
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Alejandro Carrasco Rozas analyzed the Chilean results from the lEA Civic Education
Survey to try to identify a "political culture" among twelfth grade Chilean students. He evaluated
the degree to which certain values were present in student political culture. His main conclusion
was that "the majority of Chilean youth are democratic, but politically passi ve and with scarce
reasoning skills.,,18o In general , Chilean students are conscious of their democratic rights and
civic obligations, but this does not necessarily translate into political participation. Therefore, he
concludes that Chilean youth have a "semi-liberal democratic political culture."
The analysis of both national and international sur veys on youth attitudes towards politics
show that "apathy" among Chilean youth is not as simple as commonly perceived. The 2007
World Youth Report by the UN analyzes results from the 2004 Latinobar6metro survey,
concluding that the political fervor that in the past characterized many Latin American societies
has diminished. However, it attributes this trend more to the changing nature of politics and the
"absence of an enabling environment" than political apathy. Many of the political ideologies that
once dominated in Latin America have diminished in importance, which is especially seen in the
Chilean case . The center-"Ieft" Concertaci6n, including the Socialist party, has moved to the
center, leaving behind ideologies from before 1973, demonstrated in its adhesion to the
neoliberal economic model and abandoned critique of capitalism. As discussed in the previous
section, this has caused disillusionment with political parties, reflected among youth in the
surveys analyzed above. The UN report contributes the growing lack of confidence in political
parties to an "anti-political attitude among many citizens, including youth.,,181

180 Alejandro Carrasco Rozas, "Estudio de valores y actitudes pol iticas de estudiantes chilenos de 4° afio medio: EI
rezago de la cultural politica chilen a en el fortalecimiento democratico," Master's Thesis, Institute of Political
Science, Pontificia Universidad Catolica, 2005, 124.
181 Unit ed Nat ions , "Latin American Youth in an era ofsocio-economic and political change," Chapter 2 in World
Youth Report 2007 (New York: United Nations , 2007)
http ://www .un .or g/esalso cde v/unv in/documents/w yr07 ch apt er 2 .pd f, 65,67 .
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Though it may seem difficult to rationalize a mass mobilization of politically apathetic
students, it is necessary to highlight that their demands were not inherently political, and focused
specifically on education. They wanted a state system that would provide a high quality
education to all students, regardless of socio-economic level. Beyond that, the movement did not
have a political agenda. In fact, the ACES prided itself as incorporating a wide variety of
political views, and emphasized not getting caught up in partisan issues. It is possible, however,
to interpret the Revoluci6n Pinguina in the framework of the changing nature of politics
following the democratic transition. The low level of faith that students have with political
parties and government institutions caused them to choose protest as a method to bring about
reforms, especially after their 2005 petition to dialogue with MINEDUC was ignored.
Even though students used protests and took over buildings, they were not delinquents
simply protesting against a policy the y did not agree with. Instead , they protested for reforms.
Carrasco Rozas evaluates students' propensity towards subpolitics, or forms of politics outside
and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states-protests,
building occupations and graffiti-that provoke and alter the functioning of institutions or the
social order. 182 At first glance the Revoluci6n Pinguina would seem to fall into this category,
given the tactics used by the students. However, according to Carrasco Rozas ' analysis, these
concepts have not been strongly incorporated into the political culture of Chilean youth--only
17% had a high tendency to integrate these ideas into their political culture and 44% had medium
tendencies. 183 Additionally, upon closer examination , it becomes harder to characterize
Revoluci6n in this manner. First of all, to hold a protest in Santiago it is necessary to gain
permission from the municipality of Santiago-mobilizations are only allowed in the centro and
182 Boris Holtzer and Mads P. Sorenson, " Reth ink ing Subpolitics," Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 20, No .2
(2003) hnp :1l Ies.sagepu b .com/cgil contentlab stract/2 0/2/79 .
183 Carrasco Rozas, 97 .
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are limited to certain streets. For the most part , students obtained the necessary permits when
large street protests were scheduled. Secondly, in most cases school administrators were
supportive of, or at least tolerated , the tomas. Instead of being a forceful protest against the
schools ' themselves, the tomas were meant to paralyze the education system and send a message
to the government that the students wanted a better education. So although students utilized
methods that could be characterized as subpolitics, they did so within the framework of political
institutions. Their intent in using street protests and tomas was to eventually spur negotiation
with government officials to arrive at a favorable outcome, not to destroy or harm government
infrastructure.
Participation

10

the Revolucion Pinguina does not mean that students are any more

interested in formal politics. Very few leaders of the student movement desire to get actively
involved in Chilean politics, at least in the traditional sense. Most emphasized that they did not
belong to any party and many voiced a disinterest or disappointment with the political party
system because it did not represent them or their interests.l'" Sebastian Vielmas, one student
leader who happened to also be a leader in the Socialist Youth, admitted that his conventional
political participation was rare, and also hinted that he might leave his position within the
organization due to disillusionment with the Soc ialist Party. Given that the political outcomes of
the protests (discussed in the next section) did not address some of the most important student
demands, it is no wonder that participants are not willing to participate politically. They do not
view institutions such as political parties as able or willing to represent their needs, and
furthermore do not believe that their involvement in formal politics will bring about any true
change.
184 Conversations with the author, January 2008, Santiago, Chile; Tamara Gutierrez Portillo and Cristina Caviedes
Reyes, Revolucion Pingiiina: La Primera Gran Movilizacion del Siglo XXI en Chile, (Santiago : Editorial Ayun ,
2006).
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Despite this, the Revolucion did demonstrate that Chilean students are more than
material istic youth that "aren' t here or there" with anything. They care about something-getting
a high quality education. The opinion surveys showed that students value a government that
provides social services and redistributes wealth . The stark inequalities that persist in Chilean
society , reproduced by the education system, demonstrate that the Chilean government has not
done enough in this respect. Harkening back to the quote that opened this chapter, the changing
nature of conventional political participation in Chile made popular protests a viable way for
students to voice their discontent, but without demonstrating a propensity towards traditional
forms of political participation.
The 2006 student movement certainly caused society to reexamine, if only temporarily ,
the way people thought about Chilean youth. Rodrigo Cornejo of the Chilean Observatory of
Educational Policy at the University of Chile noted that "a lot of people though the young people
were simply individualistic, selfish consumers. But the long-term changes the students were
pressing for this year weren't going to directly benefit them-it was for their younger brothers
and sisters.,,185 What sort of long term changes did the students achieve? What was the political
outcome of this protest that challenged the stereotype of political apathy? These questions and
more will be addressed below.
4.4 Outcomes: The Political Response to the 2006 Mobilizations
On 9 April 2008, the Education Commission of the Chilean House of Deputies
unanimously passed the New General Education Law (Ley General de Educa cion , LGE). It is
expected that it will soon pass after a general vote in the House. This proyecto de ley (proposed
law, similar to a bill in the US system), introduced by President Michelle Bachelet in April 2007,
will repeal the LOCE if passed. It not only promises to increase the quality of education for all
185
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students, but represents an important step in dismantling authoritarian enclaves. To think that the
Revoluci6n Pinguina was the catalyst for this new law suggests that the political outcome of the
student protests will be important and have a lasting effect on the education system. Why, then,
are student leaders and their supporters disappointed? This section will explore what major
changes the new law puts forward and how well they reflect the proposals of the students. It will
also explore the aftermath of the student movement itself and especially take a look at internal
politicization. Finally, it will conclude by examining the effect of protests on Chilean society.
The process undertaken to arrive at the LGE was not an easy one, characterized by a high
degree of debate, both between the two political coalitions and within the educational
community. The concepts in the proyecto de ley were based on a report generated by the
Presidential Advisory Committee for Educational Quality (Con sejo Ase sor Presidencial Para La
Calidad de fa Educacion, CAPCE), formed at the beginning of June 2006 in direct response to

the protests. It was composed of approximately eighty members, including teachers, professors,
school administrators, educational policy makers, academics, religious representatives, members
of indigenous communities, six university students and six secondary students. 186 As noted in
Chapter Two , student leaders wanted at least 50% student representation on the committee. On
11 June 2006, the ACES ratified the creation of the CAPCE , but this did not signal an end to
their dissatisfaction. Students continued to protest and occupy schools until November 2006,
mainly in response to a preliminary report released in September by the Advisory Committee.
The students, supported by the Teachers' Union, deemed its findings "unsatisfactory." This time

186Juan Garcia-Huidobro and Patricia Medran o, Inform e FinaL de Cons ejo Asesor PresidenciaL para La Calidad de La
Educacion, 1I December, 2006 , 8-1 I. www .consejoeducac ion.cl/articu los.!] nforrnefinal.pd f
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the protests failed to garner the widespread response as they had in May, and most tomas ended
when police forced students to vacate the school buildings.l'"
In addition to the creation of the CAPCE, President Bachelet promised some immediate
concessions to the students in June 2006. She pledged to increase the quantity of free school
lunches provided to students-200,000 more in 2006 and 300,000 more in 2007, and announced
that the school transport pass could be used 24 hours a day, seven day s a week during the school
year, and would be free for all students that demonstrated need . The scholarship to cover the cost
of the PSU would be extended to more students, and a program was announced to increase the
infrastructure of 520 schools around the country. 188 For the most part, these promises have been
carried out. Maria Jesus Sanhueza highlighted these changes as one of the main positive
outcomes of the protests, because it improves the daily lives of students and helps alleviate the
economic pressure of many families . 189 However, these changes represented the "short-term"
demands of the students. The "long-term" structural changes were investigated by the Advisory
Committee and some eventually formed the new LGE introduced to the House of Deputies.
The final report published by the CAPCE in December 2006 made a number of
recommendations. Being a large and diverse group, it was impossible to come to a consensus on
all issues. The report reflects this, and on many topics provides more than one proposal for
change. The committee had five commissions that worked on the following areas: Regulatory
Framework, Institutional Structure, Educational Quality, Teachers and Higher Education. Most
recommendations made by the commissions, except for those on Teachers and Higher Education,
were included to some extent in the LGE. The Committee acknowledged that it was necessary to

Gutierrez Portillo and Caviedes Reyes, 120-125.
"Las propuestas del gobierno a los estudiantes secundari os," El Mercurio, 2 June 2006,
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189 Sanhueza in conversation with the author , Santiago, Chile, January 2008 .
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change the LaCE and the system's regulatory framework to correct the lack of democratic
legitimacy and to ensure that the state guarantees not only educational freedom, but the right to a
high quality public education.
After President Bachelet introduced the law in April 2007, discussion ensued between the
two political coalitions until an historic agreement was reached in November 2007. This
agreement was necessary because the LGE represented a constitutional change (as explained in
Section 1.1) . One Chilean newspaper summarized why they were able to finally agree: "For the
Concertaci6n, it signals the end of the last ' binding law ' of the dictatorship [and] they are
smiling in the Alianza because the law will move forward without touching the freedom of

educanon.v"" On the road to approval, two issues were very controversial: student selection and
the requirement that subsidized schools be run solely by non-profit organizations. The former
remained in the proposed law , prohibiting the selection of students from schools with state
funding for any criteria until eighth grade.l'" The latter, however, was eventually removed from
the proposed law when it became clear that the Alianza would not agree to it if this statute
remained . Despite this, the proposed law demands that the only line of business for corporations
running schools with state vouchers be education. In other words, a company that also dedicates
itself to bread making can not administer a school that receives state funding, but it can make all
the profit it wants. In The elimination of the non-profit statute angered many.
The greatest achievement of the LGE is that it will replace the LaCE, in theory
representing a great political gain for the student movement. In practice its value lies in the
symbolism of revoking one of the last binding laws. The LGE represents many important
190 Soray a Rodriguez, "Gobierno y Ali anza firman hist6rico acuerdo que pone lap ida ala LOCE," La Nacion, 14
No vember 2007, http ://www .lanacion .c llprontus notici as v2 /s ite/art ic!2007 1I 13/pags/200711132 1')409 .hlm l.
191 The onl y exception is paroch ial schoo ls, which may select based on conformance with their "education al
project." Schools may also give preference to students whose siblings already attend the school or whose parents are
employed at the school.
192 Rodriguez, "Gobierno . .. "
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changes to the LOCE. It establishes that every student has the right to a high quality public
education, despite the fact that it does this while maintaining the open market principle of
"freedom to education." It establishes stricter requirements for individuals, foundations or
corporations owning and administering schools with state funding. Two other proposed laws , the
Law of the Superintendency and the Subsidy Law, will establish an Office of the Superintendent
to regulate the education system and increase the state educational subsidy by 15%, respectively.
The Office of the Superintendent will serve to evaluate and audit the educational establishments
recognized by the state, to make sure that they are effectively spending the state subsidy, and
ensure the quality of education through the evaluation of students and teachers. These proposed
laws emphasize accountability on the part of schools to provide a high quality education,
something that the LOCE lacked, signaling an important gain for the Chilean education system.
The proposed regulation of subsidy money is especially crucial given that Minister of Education,
Yasna Provoste, was impeached on 16 April 2008 after an audit discovered irregularities
amounting to approximately $500 million in the educational subsidy budget. Though not
personally responsible, the Senate voted to impeach the ex-Minister for failing to correct these

. f ractions.
.
193
grave In
The LGE has received heavy criticism from student leaders and professors, especially
those from the Teachers ' Union. They argue that the law gets rid of the LOCE in name without
significantly changing the model, simply providing more regulation. Sanhueza summed up this
view, saying "[the proposed law] will bring about a better quality education, but it will not give

193 "Senad o aprueba ac usac i6 n qu e destituye a Provoste de su cargo ," El Mercurio, 16 April 2008,
hUD ;!!www.emol.com!noticias!nac ional/deta Ile/detallenotic ias.asp?idnotic ia=300722.
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us the education to which we aspire.,,194 The LGE does ignore important issues, such as
municipalization and the JEC , in spite being principal demands of the students. These two topics
were addressed in the Advisory Committee. Regarding municipalization, it stated that "the
system of municipal administration presents serious problems, putting at risk the population that
assists these schools, mainl y the poor,,195 and proposed four alternati ves to the municipal model.
The Advisory Committee also affirmed that the JEC had many glitches, and recommended
specific courses of action, such as guaranteeing a more balanced curriculum and providing more
resources for infrastructure improvements. There was also discontent about the elimination of the
non-profit clause . For Sebastian Vielmas, the fact that the Concertaci6n did not press more to
eliminate the ability to profit demonstrated "timidity" and made him lose faith in the ability of
the Concertaci6n to bring about true change. He sees this law as "changing a few little things so
that the big picture doesn 't change at all ;" in other words, just another compromise.196
Students and the Teachers' Union were also unhappy about the policy of student
selection, sustaining that the conditions were not strict enough. Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huidobro,
the head of the CAPCE, wrote an editorial showing his support for the policy in theory, but
arguing that it was arbitrary to prohibit selection only until eighth grade. He notes that it would
be logical either to forbid it until tenth grade, when "general formation" ends or until twelfth
grade, when obligatory education ends.

197

He also criticizes the fact that the proposed law does

not get rid of the shared funding policy that allows some subsidized pri vate schools to charge an
additional fee to parents. He argues that this is essentially "financial selection." Around one third
194 "Proyecto Ley General de Educaci6n" 9 April 2007,
http://www .educarchile.c l/ronal. I3 ase/Web/VerConten ido.aspx?GU [0=29552 6 fD-be Id-40dd-a503
5228 5587ee2e&ID =J 32837 (10 April 2007).
195 Garcia-Hu idobro and Medrano , I I, 26.
196 Sebastian Vielmas (Former President, Student Center, Liceo de Aplicaci6n) in discussion with the author,
Santiago, Chile, January 2008 .
197 In Chile , "general formation" refers to I "_lOth grade, when a general integrated curriculum is followed. In I Ilh_
rz" grade, students chose whether to specialize in Scientific-Humanistic or Technical education .
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of subsidized schools (both municipal and private) charge an additional fee, meaning that if the
parents cannot afford to pay, their children wil1 not be able to attend these schools. 198 The
proposed law states that the "selection process can in no way consider the economic or social
situation of the applicant" yet charging a fee does exactly that. 199 This limits access to a large
portion of publicly-funded schools based on the ability to pay, failing to adequately address the
problem of socio-economic segmentation in the education system. In fact, students had
demanded a complete renovation to the system of financing. Though the per-student voucher will
increase if the new Subsidy Law passes, the demand-side approach of funding through vouchers
will remain.
In stark contrast to student leaders, Professor Alejandra Mizala, member of the CAPCE,
touted the LGE, especially the new regulatory aspects. Although she recognized that the work of
the Advisory Committee was difficult due to differing points of view and political beliefs, she
believed that the new law did a good job including the majority of the CAPCE 's
recommendations. She blamed discontent on "ideologies" that prevented students and teachers
from seeing that the ability of subsidized private schools to profit would not negatively affect
quality as long as the schools were properly audited, as proposed under the Superintendency
Law.

Mizala was convinced that unlike the past, the new regulatory framework would

effectively prevent the misuse of funds and increase the quality of publicly-funded education.i'"
The students, however, disagree.

198 Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huidobro , " La 'selecci6n de alumnos' en la Ley General de Educaci6n," Docencia No . 32
(August 2007): 27 .
199 Mensaje de s.£. La Presidenta de la Republica con el que inicia un proyecto de ley que establece la Ley General
de Educacion, Mensaje No. 55-355 , Santiago, 9 April 2007, parrafo 2, articulo 11, p. 30.
200 Alejandra M izala (Associate Professor of Economics, Facu lty of Industrial Engineering, University of Ch ile and

member of Presidential Advisory Committee on Education) in discussion with author, January 2008 , Santiago,
Chile .
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When asked what the greatest achievement of the Revoluci6n Pinguina was, student
leaders and members of the Teachers' Union do not point to the LGE. Vielmas went so far as to
say that the proposed law was not even a true outcome of the Revolucion, contending that the
Concertaci6n "appropriated" the movement for their own political gains instead of giving the
students the changes they dernanded.i'" Sanhueza and other student leaders talked a lot about the
fact that the movement raised consciousness, both among the students themselves and in the
population in general. Sanhueza contended that now there are Student Centers at more schools,
and students are more aware of their rights regarding education. Luis Vicencio and Jaime
Gajardo of the Teachers ' Union pointed out that politicall y, education is now a hot topic, and that
it would undoubtedly playa role in the presidential election slated for 2009. Sanhueza along with
Vania Gonzalez also contended that the Revolucion Pinguina had an effect on the outcome of
other social movements, including favorable results for striking copper workers in November
2006, and higher public support for the Mapuche movement, especially a hunger strike waged by
activist Patricia Troncoso that ended in January 2008. More research is necessary to corroborate
whether or not the Revoluci6n Pinguina indeed had these effects. However, it shows how these
students place their movement within the broader social context of Chilean social protest.
Vielmas and Nicolas Vicente blame the fact that the movement did not gain more in
terms of the LGE on the weakening and politicization of the movement during key junctures in
the negotiating process. In June 2006, Karina Delfino and Cesar Valenzuela stepped down as
202

spokespeople for the ACES , citing exhaustion and the need to focus on their academics.

Many

other students also cited academic pressures for their decreased participation in the mo vement,
while others believed that differing political ideologies and the influence of political parties
20 1 Jaime

Gajardo (President, Colegio de Profesores, AG), Gonzalez, Sanhueza, Luis Vicencio (Teacher and
Member, Colegio de Profesores, AG) and Vielmas in conversations with the author, Santiago, Chile, January 2008.
202 Gutierrez Portillo and Caviedes Reyes, 82.
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eventually played a role in weakening the movement. At its beginnings the movement was
characterized as being apolitical , but during the negotiating process with the government this
broke down. Vielmas blames the infiltration of political parties, who offered students jobs or
other benefits within the party if they would support the party position during the negotiations.
Whatever the true reason, in October 2006 when the debate over profit making was at its peak ,
students failed to organize themselves to the extent they had in June. Nicolas Vicente claims that
students have no right to complain about the outcome, because when it was most important they
failed to demonstrate a united front to the decision makers as it had in June, resulting in the
creation of the CAPCE and other favorable concessions.i'"
For the student leaders of the movement, the political outcomes were mixed . While it was
obviously a great accomplishment to repeal the LOCE and institute more strict regulation of the
educational system, students do not find these legislative advancements sufficient to give them
the type of education they demand. They concede that important advancements have been made,
especially in terms of the short term goals of the protest, but find the true success in the
consciousness they have raised among students and within society- something that is intangible
and hard to measure. The future of the movement is unclear. The year 2007 was fairly quiet in
terms of protests and tomas, but both student leaders and the Teacher's Union promised that
2008 would have more action. On 9 April 2008, the same day the LGE was approved in the
House of Deputies by the Education Commission, a peaceful march of 1,200 demonstrators
organized by the newly formed National Assembly for the Right to Education (ANDE) protested
profiting from education. ANDE, composed by familiar organizations such as the ACES, the
Teachers' Union, plus many more, is trying to ignite the flame for further protest against the

203

Vicente in discussion with the author, January 2008 .
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outcome that they have deemed unsatisfactory.r'" On 24 April , thousands of students in Santiago
and the regions of Chile protested the LGE by marching in the streets. Students continue to be
organized, and the will to demand more change is starkly apparent.

"Marcha contra ellucro ' calienta motores' del mundo social ante pronta aprobaci6n de la LGE," OPEG-I , 10
April, 2008, http: //www .opech.c1/editoriales/2008_04 /2008_04 _1 O_Marcha_contra_elIucroz.pdf t 10 April 2008).
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Conclusion
Implications for the Future
This paper has described and analyzed the various conditions that led up to the
emergence of a powerful student movement that shook Santiago and the regions of Chile for four
weeks in 2006. The demands for change in the education system can not be explained by a single
discipline; for this reason this paper places the movement within an historical , economic and
political framework. The roots of the penguins ' plight lie in the educational system that they
inherited from Augusto Pinochet, whose dictatorship they fortunately did not have to grow up
under. This market-based , semi-privatized system was immortalized with the signing of the
Constitutional Organic Law of Education (LOCE) in 1990, one day before Pinochet left power.
Throughout the 1990s, the democratic administrations of the Concertaci6n sought to "pay back
the social debt " by enacting reforms to the system, but without making any structural changes. In
2006, the education system was in crisis. National and international standardized test scores
showed that the 1990s reforms had not helped significantly improve the overall quality of
education, and vast performance disparities existed between socioeconomic groups.
A number of factors that contributed to the emergence of the student movement in Chile
have been explained. Students who lived for sixteen years under democracy with strong
macroeconomic performance wondered why stark socio-economic inequalities still existed. They
could see this reflected in their schools and knew that access to high quality primary and
secondary education that would eventually lead to higher education was the onl y way to achieve
social mobility . However, this way was blocked to many of them by the fact that only the richest
sectors of the population could afford the kind of primary and secondary education necessary to
go to college. Chilean students used popular protest to demand reform to the education system, at
the same time challenging perceptions about their "apathy" while proving that participation in
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this movement would not cause them to participate in or care about formal politics in the future.
The movement filled an opening offered by the changing political en vironment in which political
parties were more disconnected from their popular bases of support. Secondary students sent a
powerful message to the Chilean government, and elicited a response, deemed precedent-setting
by politicians and policy-makers, but insufficient by students.
Throughout this paper I have tried to present a comprehensive analysis of the emergence
of the Revoluci6n Pinguina, but obviously there is room for more exploration, especially as time
passes and the effects of the proposed General Education Law (LGE) are played out. Now that
the LOCE, one of the last "binding laws" left by the authoritarian regime has been overturned ,
will the Concertaci6n still be limited in terms of carrying out social policy? Perhaps now the
limits come from a different source-the desire to maintain macroeconomic stability and growth
through the neoliberal economic model. Conceivably, as some authors have suggested, President
Bachelet's administration does signal the beginning of the "post-post authoritarian period," not
only because Pinochet died in 2006, but because instead of being limited by laws enacted under
the dictatorship, Chilean politicians and policy makers have now chosen to limit their social
policy options to privilege the elite economic class, mainly in the export sector. The LGE will
not get rid of the "freedom to education," otherwise known as a market-based education model
that the Chicago Boys dreamed up in the 1980s . Though it undeniably changes the role that the
state play s in guaranteeing the right to a high-quality education, many are not convinced that the
new regulatory structure will be sufficient to fix serious educational inequality that only serves to
worsen societal inequality.
The Revolucion Pinguina was important, mostl y because it showed that marginalized
actors, such as students, who for the most part did not even have the power to vote, could
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instigate a political response. Though this response is not what they wanted, it shows that these
types of actors still have a say. In an era where control seems to increasingly be in the hands of
the economic elite, the power of masses of disenfranchi sed youth to cause a president to create a
new law is noteworthy. This time , the law may not fix all of the problems, but students and
teachers seem willing to try again. However, recent political developments in Chile do not bode
well for the Concertaci6n or the student mo vement. On 18 April 2008, Yasna Provoste was the
first Minister to be impeached since the transition to democracy in 1990. During the proceedings,
two independent senators who had previously voted with the Concertaci6n sided with the
opposition, tipping the vote in favor of impeachment. The emergence of this "new majority" in
the Senate threatens the Concertaci6n's ability to implement its legislative agenda, notably the
creation of the Superintendency of Education, a law that would address exactly the problem for
which ex-Minister Provoste was impeached. Though the LGE and education reform in general
has bipartisan support, it "will need careful steering through Congress" to prevent detrimental
changes by the opposition.i'" Given that the student movement was disappointed with the
reforms proposed by the Concertaci6n, increased opposition power in Congress does not bode
well for further reforms. At this point another large mobilization on education may further
weaken the Concertaci6n and the "new majority" will be less receptive to the more radical
structural changes that students demand. However, on 24 April students demonstrated that they
have not yet tired of challenging Bachelet's administration to carry out the reforms that they
wanted.
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